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HIDING IN PLAIN VIEW: A PATH AROUND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
William J. Rich*
INTRODUCTION
Privileges or immunities of United States citizens include rights that “owe their
existence to the Federal government, . . . its Constitution, or its laws.”1 The Four-
teenth Amendment provides that no state shall abridge those rights,2 and provisions
of that amendment override claims to state sovereign immunity.3 As a result, federal
laws that protect the pay and working conditions of workers, and keep them free
from discrimination based upon their age or disability, should be fully enforceable
against state governments, agencies, or officials.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon a doctrine of state
sovereign immunity to block efforts by state employees to enforce their federal
rights through suits for monetary damages.4 In every case, the Court upheld the
underlying federal laws,5 but limited enforcement because laws derived from the
Commerce Clause remained subject to Eleventh Amendment state immunity,6 and,
although the Fourteenth Amendment would override that immunity,7 none of the
laws in question involved enforcement of the Due Process or Equal Protection
* James R. Ahrens Professor, Washburn University School of Law. For helpful feedback
at various stages of this project, I thank Professors Myrl Duncan, Patricia Judd, David
Rubenstein, Craig Martin, and Freddy Sourgens, and my daughters Jennifer Nicholas and
Anna Rich.
1 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (emphasis added).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (block-
ing enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (blocking enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (blocking enforcement of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act).
5 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (holding that “Title 1 of the ADA still prescribes
standards applicable to the States”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (holding “only that, in the ADEA,
Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private
individuals”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court merely
held that an individual cannot sue a state to enforce her statutory rights under FLSA).
6 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (stating that “Congress may not . . . base its abrogation
of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I”).
7 Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (majority opinion).
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Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 No one asked whether any of the acts in
question fell within the bounds of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.9
Why ignore such an obvious question? Generations of lawyers have been taught
that, by failing to incorporate the Bill of Rights into that Clause, the Supreme Court
robbed it of significant content.10 The Justices most recently confirmed that lesson
as “settled doctrine.”11 While doing so, they reiterated the traditional phrase: “[T]he
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights ‘which owe their exis-
tence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws.’”12 Because no one asked, however, they did not address the question about
which rights owe their existence to federal laws.13 The discussion which follows
answers that question, reaffirming a deeply rooted understanding that Americans
have the same federal rights, and the same ability to enforce those rights, regardless
of the state in which they reside.
Part I of this Article provides background, including an overview of historical
conceptions of sovereignty and the debates regarding enforcement of federal law
that took place in the decades leading up to the Civil War.14 Contested issues of state
authority to avoid or nullify federal law dominated antebellum constitutional dis-
putes.15 Records of that era demonstrate that the terms “privileges” and “immunities”
did not have precise meaning, but rather reflected rights associated with a particular
governing authority, either state or federal, and generally subject to legislative con-
trol.16 Both of those factors influenced the subsequent formation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.17
Part II focuses on interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Exhaustive
analysis of congressional debates leaves room for disagreement. Concurrent legislative
action, however, consistently linked “privileges” and “immunities” to the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States.18 Subsequent Supreme Court rulings and consti-
tutional commentary confirmed the understanding that the Privileges or Immunities
8 See cases cited supra note 4.
9 Publications in which I have raised this issue include WILLIAM J. RICH, 1 MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 713–37 (3d ed. 2011); William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immu-
nities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 208
(2002) [hereinafter Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously].
10 See sources cited supra note 9.
11 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describ-
ing reliance upon the Due Process Clause as the source of incorporation of the Bill of Rights
as “settled doctrine”).
12 Id. at 754 (majority opinion) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
79 (1872)).
13 See id. at 742–91.
14 Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously, supra note 9, at 167.
15 Id. at 167–70.
16 See infra Section I.C.
17 See infra Part I.
18 See infra Section II.B.
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Clause protected those rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government,
its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”19
The third and fourth Parts shift to twentieth-century developments and contem-
porary debates. Part III helps to explain why, although original Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause included enforcement of rights
derived from congressional Commerce Clause authority, litigants, judges, and scholars
rarely paid attention to that relationship.20 They had good reason for such neglect.
By most measures, the Supremacy Clause provided ample authority for such en-
forcement,21 and in any event the scope of rights protected under nineteenth-century
conceptions of the Commerce Clause offered minimal protection for individual
rights.22 As a result, as described in Part IV, when the Supreme Court majority con-
cluded that Eleventh Amendment state immunity barred claims based upon the Fair
Labor Standards Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, no one considered the
relationship to “privileges” or “immunities” as a basis for overcoming such barriers.23
When litigants wake up to that relationship, however, such conclusions should
change. The Supreme Court has already defined the scope of federal “rights, privi-
leges, or immunities” to include rights such as those belonging to government
employees.24 Judges who recognize the link between that text and the Fourteenth
Amendment should also understand that when Congress explicitly authorizes actions
against state agencies or officials, claims for monetary damages by injured parties
should be enforced by the courts.
I. ANTEBELLUM BACKGROUND
Actions, disputes, and decisions that preceded the Civil War provide context for
understanding subsequent amendments. Out of that background, three points have
particular relevance to questions about the scope of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. The first involves the understanding of dual sovereignty built into the original
constitutional structure, referred to by Alexander Hamilton as the “plan of the
convention.”25 The second involves the conflicts over state and national sovereignty
that became a primary focus of constitutional disputes during the antebellum era.26
19 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (emphasis added).
20 Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously, supra note 9, at 182.
21 See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 346.
23 Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously, supra note 9, at 217–18.
24 Congress used this language in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, adopted to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, and currently found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court
broadly construed those terms in a series of cases including Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) (upholding provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act). For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 447–50.
25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
26 See Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously, supra note 9, at 167–68 (noting
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And a third background factor that influenced the choice of language used in the
Fourteenth Amendment involved understanding of the terms “privileges” and “im-
munities” reflected by court decisions and other legal texts generated during that
time period.27
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, Americans shared an understand-
ing of “sovereignty” that could be divided, but not shared.28 The concept that states
retained sovereignty within the sphere of national authority came later,29 and only
gained credence in disputes over slavery and tariffs when advocates of states’ rights
asserted a right to nullify federal law.30 National figures countered those claims, but
lacked the political strength or judicial authority to protect individuals from state
violations of national law.31 As a result of this background, those who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment understood the need to establish or reaffirm authority to
enforce individual rights, including those derived from federal statutes.32 This back-
ground helps to explain why no state should be allowed to escape from enforcement
of federal statutory rights.
A. Sovereignty and the Plan of the Convention
Participants in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 met for the purpose of
rebalancing the relationship between individual states and a new national govern-
ment.33 The Articles of Confederation had treated each individual state as an inde-
pendent sovereign, beginning with the phrase “Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence,”34 and emphasized in the conclusion that no change
could be made in the Articles without unanimous consent.35 That model had failed.36
The new government, which arose through popular participation in state con-
ventions,37 transferred sovereign authority over identified subject areas, ranging
that arguments to nullify federal law prompted historians to regard the antebellum period as
one of “constitutional crisis”).
27 See infra Section I.C.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 33–42.
29 See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
30 Pro-slavery individuals hoped to nullify federal law under Privileges or Immunities
Clause challenges to protect their property rights. See Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immu-
nities” Seriously, supra note 9, at 179.
31 See id. at 167–68. Future Secretary of State Daniel Webster was unable to convince
supporters of nullification of federal law supremacy. Id.
32 See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1454–58 (1975).
33 See George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 967, 970–73 (1991).
34 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II.
35 Id. art. XXIII.
36 See Anastaplo, supra note 33, at 969–73.
37 See id. at 969–74.
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from interstate commerce to providing for a national defense.38 Outside of the scope
of those subject areas, states retained sovereignty.39 Participants in that process of
government formation understood the concept of sovereignty in classical terms: To
be sovereign meant to have “supreme” authority, and there could be no second or
auxiliary “sovereign.”40 National and state governments could, however, operate as
dual sovereigns, each within its own sphere of authority,41 and with supremacy rec-
ognized in the national government in the event of overlap.42
In reality, however, relationships between state and national sovereigns defied
such simple descriptions.43 As recently explained by Justice Kagan, state sovereignty
predated national sovereignty and arose from an independent ultimate source,44 thus
elements of state sovereignty remained after adoption of the Constitution.45 In early
decades of the nation’s history, disputes arose due to both the complexity of the
overlap in responsibility and underlying conflicts over values and policies regarding
issues including slavery, tariff disputes, and relationships with Indian Nations.46
Many of those disputes could be boiled down to competing claims of sovereignty.47
Modern confusion regarding state retention of sovereignty may be traced in part
to language used during the ratification debates that some mischaracterize as evi-
dence of state sovereign immunity even within the context of federal statutory
authority.48 For example, Hamilton wrote that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of
38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 288–92 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that the “sovereign”
was understood to be the “final and absolute political authority in the political community”);
SAMUEL WARREN, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES SYSTEMATICALLY ABRIDGED AND ADOPTED
TO THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION WITH GREAT ADDITIONS 27 (1855)
(linking “sovereignty” to the “rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state”).
41 See infra note 42.
42 Justice Brennan frequently reiterated this point. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala.
State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 191, 196 (1964) (explaining that “States surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce”).
43 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016) (noting that sovereignty
in the context of the territory of Puerto Rico “does not bear its ordinary meaning”).
44 See id. at 1871 (noting that in the relationship between the United States and Puerto
Rico, the United States acts as “ultimate sovereign,” and Puerto Rican authority is derived
from that source, thus eliminating the “dual-sovereignty” exception to application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 315 (1978) (involving competing
sovereignty claims of federal and tribal courts).
47 See id.
48 For examples of commentary regarding state sovereign immunity, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435 (1987) (explaining that at
the time when the Constitution was framed, “the true sovereign . . . must necessarily enjoy
the essential attributes of indivisible, final, and unlimited authority,” and concluding that in
the United States, ultimate sovereignty resides with the people); Paul E. McGreal, Saving
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sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”49
Such comments by Hamilton and others, however, must be understood in context.
Hamilton’s comments in The Federalist Papers addressed lawsuits against states in
cases involving diversity jurisdiction,50 and within that context states retained
sovereignty.51 He concluded that the Constitution should not be construed to autho-
rize “suits against States for the debts they owe.”52 Within the same paragraph, how-
ever, Hamilton explained that the protection of state sovereignty would not apply
if “there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.”53 When
addressing the context of legitimate federal questions, James Madison and John
Marshall both recognized the final and exclusive nature of central government
authority.54 Madison explained this distinction by noting: “With respect to the laws
of the union, it is so necessary and expedient that their judicial power should cor-
respond with the legislative, that it has not been objected to.”55
Claims that state sovereign immunity persists within the sphere of national
authority often center upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.56
Article I from Seminole Tribe: A View from The Federalist Papers, 55 SMU L. REV. 393
(2002) (arguing for a limited category of cases that meet Hamilton’s “plan of the convention”
test); Joan Meyler, A Matter of Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court’s Reformation of the Constitution in Semi-
nole Tribe and Its Progeny, 45 HOW. L.J. 77 (2001) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices
have misread or inappropriately deferred to comments of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall);
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1559 (2002) (presenting arguments that the Founders understood courts to lack only
personal jurisdiction over sovereign states); Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses
of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2002) (viewing entrenched system of immunities as result of
multiple historical errors).
49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 25, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton).
50 For a detailed analysis of Hamilton’s comments on diversity jurisdiction, see Michael
G. Collins, Judicial Independence And The Scope of Article III—A View From The Federalist,
38 U. RICH. L. REV. 675, 697–701 (2004).
51 See infra notes 52–53.
52 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 25, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton).
53 Id. at 487.
54 Madison explained that national jurisdiction extended to “certain enumerated objects”
with the boundary between national and state jurisdiction to be determined by the national
government, concluding “in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In Cohens v.
Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall recognized a “general proposition” supporting state sovereign
immunity, but explained that states had surrendered that immunity as to matters where the
Constitution transferred sovereignty to the national government. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
380–82 (1821).
55 2 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA, ON THE 17TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1787, at 390 (J. Elliot ed., 1828).
56 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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Public outrage immediately followed the opinion that states could be sued in federal
court for debts they owed to citizens of other states.57 Both Chisholm and the
Eleventh Amendment it spawned, however, reinforce the traditional conception of
separate state and federal sovereignty.58 The Eleventh Amendment preserved state
immunity in the context of disputes involving subject matter over which states re-
tained sovereignty;59 authors of that amendment were not foolish rubes who failed
to choose language that would offer a broader degree of protection, because doing
so would have conflicted with the Supremacy Clause.60 The sovereignty balance
struck in the Eleventh Amendment did not disturb the “plan of the convention” that
Hamilton had described and the states accepted.61 Several Supreme Court justices
have made that point,62 and numerous commentators agree.63
57 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (1983) (noting Georgian legislative reac-
tion, including a law making it a felony to enforce the federal judgment).
58 The Eleventh Amendment provides that: “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. By taking away diversity jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amend-
ment effectively barred the federal courts from exercising sovereignty over a state within a
sphere of continuing final state authority.
59 Id.
60 See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Rein-
terpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1927 (1983) (explaining the choice of Eleventh
Amendment language and the ease with which authors could have widened its scope).
61 Id. at 1910 n.104.
62 See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 46 n.1 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (repeating her assertion of congressional authority to abrogate state immunity
when acting pursuant to powers derived from Article I of the Constitution); Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Brennan’s
plurality opinion and noting that “numerous scholars [had] exhaustively and conclusively
refuted the contention that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of sovereign
immunity to the States”); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184,
191 (1964) (explaining that “States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce”).
63 See Amar, supra note 48, at 1435 (explaining the historical understanding that “the true
sovereign . . . must necessarily enjoy the essential attributes of indivisible, final, and un-
limited authority”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1202 (2001) (declaiming sovereign immunity as an antiquated concept that lacks his-
torical or functional support); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of state sovereign immunity); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989) (supporting congressional authority
to abrogate state immunity except where limited by Eleventh Amendment text); James F.
Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (explaining that the Constitution and the Eleventh Amend-
ment reflected compromise establishing future national fiscal authority and protecting states
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In recent decades, however, a slim but persistent majority of Supreme Court
Justices rejected that framework.64 In order to fully restore the “plan of the conven-
tion,” those decisions could and arguably should be overruled. The pages which
follow, however, demonstrate that reversing the outcome in those cases would not
require overruling prior decisions.65 Those who framed the Fourteenth Amendment
have already provided a constitutional basis for overriding claims of state sovereign
immunity within the context of individual rights based upon federal law.66 Current
courts need to acknowledge the framework already established by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
This alternative approach builds upon a general consensus that, even if the na-
tional government could not penetrate state sovereign immunity based upon powers
exercised pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, no such constraints apply to the
Fourteenth Amendment.67 The second sentence of that amendment begins with the
words “No state shall . . . .”68 If substantive clauses following that phrase incorporate
protection derived from federal statutes, then claims of state sovereignty must yield.
Nineteenth-century constitutional disputes regarding the power of Congress and the
authority retained by the states help explain why those who promulgated the Four-
teenth Amendment would have expected that result.69
B. Federal Supremacy and State Nullification
Every law student learns about the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford,70 whose appeal
for freedom personified the constitutional battles of the antebellum era. Most current
students, however, are not exposed to the disputes over slavery, tariffs, and states’
rights that generally took place outside of the courts in the preceding years. Those
disputes need to be understood in order to appreciate why those who drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment cared about the need to reestablish national supremacy.
from liability for preexisting debts); Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, and
Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
605, 647 (2001) (explaining the majority’s misconstruction of historical conceptions of sover-
eignty); Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1113, 1118 (2001) (decrying protection of state sovereign immunity as “intel-
lectually unfounded and unjust”).
64 See, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. 30; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
65 See infra Part IV.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 25–63.
67 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (noting that enforcement provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment necessarily limit state sovereignty).
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69 See infra Section I.B.
70 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Beginning in 1822, all sailors of African ancestry who arrived in southern ports
became subject to arrest and imprisonment.71 Those seizures conflicted with national
authority to regulate interstate commerce72 and with a federal treaty protecting the
rights of British citizens.73 The first case to challenge those laws involved Harry
Elkison, a Jamaican sailing under the British flag who was seized and jailed upon
his arrival in Charleston Harbor.74 That seizure led to British protests and a habeas
corpus petition in federal court heard on circuit by Supreme Court Justice William
Johnson.75 In the case of Elkison v. Deliesseline,76 Justice Johnson found that the
transfer of commerce and treaty powers to the national government eliminated state
authority to enact conflicting legislation.77 Justice Johnson concluded, however, that
the federal court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction in such cases and therefore could
not provide relief to Elkison.78
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who became the nation’s sixth president
just two years later,79 admonished the South Carolina government for its treatment
of British sailors80 and turned for support to Attorney General William Wirt, who
also concluded that South Carolina’s law conflicted with the Commerce Clause and
with the laws and treaties of the United States.81 Rather than accepting Wirt’s opinion,
however, the South Carolina state senate declared that “[T]he duty of the state to
guard against insubordination or insurrection . . . is paramount to all laws, all
treaties, all constitutions.”82
The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 effectively ended efforts to enforce
federal law against states that defied federal law by arresting seamen with African
ancestry. Jackson’s first Attorney General, John Berrien, asserted that state authority
to exclude goods or persons who endangered a state’s social climate fell within the
71 For more detailed discussion, see William J. Rich, Lessons of Charleston Harbor: The
Rise, Fall and Revival of Pro-Slavery Federalism, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 569, 577–82
(2005). See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1816–1836, at 54 (1966).
72 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) (establishing federal
authority over navigation).
73 See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366) (citing
the commercial convention with Great Britain of 1815).
74 Rich, supra note 71, at 570.
75 Id. at 580.
76 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
77 Id. at 495.
78 Id. at 496.
79 John Quincy Adams, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/john
quincyadams [https://perma.cc/3HBK-DJ55] (explaining that John Quincy Adams became
president in 1825).
80 See Rich, supra note 71, at 582.
81 A reprint of Wirt’s opinion appears in FREE COLORED SEAMEN—MAJORITY AND MI-
NORITY REPORTS, H.R. REP. NO. 80, at 35–36 (1843).
82 Rich, supra note 71, at 581–82.
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scope of the Tenth Amendment, and took precedence over federal Commerce Clause
authority.83 Roger Taney, known most for his role as the Supreme Court Chief
Justice whose decision in Dred Scott84 helped to trigger the Civil War,85 anticipated
that decision in an Attorney General’s opinion, which demeaned all members of the
African race and affirmed state power to defy any federal laws that would interfere
with state power to enact laws designed to prevent insurrection among slaves.86
When federal authorities failed to act, the Massachusetts legislature took up the
cause and sent Judge Samuel Hoar as an emissary to Charleston “for the purpose of
instituting suits and bringing the question of the constitutionality of the acts before
the Supreme Court.”87 The South Carolina legislature, however, met Hoar’s arrival
in Charleston by asserting the state’s inherent right to exclude “seditious persons”
from their territory.88 Before Hoar could be formally expelled, the threat of mob
violence forced him to flee from Charleston.89 As much as Dred Scott came to
symbolize the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize national authority to limit
slavery,90 the Hoar affair became symbolic of southern defiance of federal law and
83 2 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 427–42
(Benjamin F. Hall ed., Washington, Robert Farnham 1852).
84 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (concluding that Congress had
no power to free slaves in United States territories because African Americans had no claim
to constitutional rights).
85 See generally Rich, supra note 71, at 599.
86 CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD 1836–64, at 380 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974). Taney continued to express such
views as Chief Justice. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 466 (1849) (up-
holding state authority to prevent entry by “any person or description of persons whom it
regards as injurious to their welfare”).
87 Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts,
1822–1845, 1 J.S. HIST. 3, 22 (1935). Massachusetts also sent an emissary to New Orleans
on the same mission, and with comparable results. Id. at 23; see also WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 132–40
(1977) (describing a series of confrontations over the Negro Seamen’s Acts, including an
opinion by then Attorney General Roger Taney that a state’s police powers overrode the
federal government’s treaty making power); Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 791, 796 (1996).
88 STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES
238 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1970). On the same day that the news reported South Carolina’s
legislative effort to expel Hoar, it also reported John Quincy Adams’ effort in Congress to
rescind rules of the House of Representatives that excluded petitions for abolition. CHARLESTON
MERCURY, Dec. 7, 1844. On the day after Hoar’s arrival in Charleston, the South Carolina
House of Representatives was asked to call a Convention to be held in Charleston of the
“Southern States of this Confederacy.” CHARLESTON COURIER, Dec. 2, 1844. The purpose
of the proposed Convention was “to solicit the cooperation of our sister States of the South
in the effort to reform the Legislature of the Federal Government on the subject of the Tariff,
and avert the progress of Abolition.” Id.
89 See Hamer, supra note 87, at 23.
90 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Dred Scott became the most
notorious court opinion of the nineteenth century. Because of his African ancestry, Scott
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the national government’s failure to protect its citizens from hostile state actions.91
Treatment of Judge Hoar remained on the minds of those who framed the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution.92
At the same time that national leaders argued over the enforcement of federal
law in southern ports, tariff disputes triggered constitutional conflicts based upon
southern state claims of authority to nullify federal law.93 From the outset, national
tariff policies had provoked sectional conflict,94 and when economic stagnation hit
southern states in the 1820s, national tariff policies became a ready target to blame
for the miseries of cotton farmers.95 They also helped to fuel the argument that states
possessed inherent authority to nullify federal law.96
Memorable events of the 1820s and 1830s included challenges to federal author-
ity at the highest level.97 Vice President John C. Calhoun openly defied President
Andrew Jackson, asserting an implied state authority to veto actions of the national
government.98 The “Great Debates” between Senators Daniel Webster, Robert Hayne,
and Calhoun could be encapsuled by Calhoun’s claim that “sovereignty is in the
could not be an American citizen, he therefore had no standing to sue in court and could not
assert the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Id. at
404–27. Furthermore, classification of slaves as property meant that Congress had no power
to grant them freedom when taken to federal territories, and no authority to regulate slavery
within those territories. Id. at 449–52.
91 See, e.g., remarks recounting Hoar’s experience in the context of debating the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1598 (1856) (statement of Reps. William
Boyce and Edward Dickinson); CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1556 (1854) (statement
of Sen. Andrew Butler); CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1012 (1854) (statement of Sen.
Charles Sumner); CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1154–55 (1854); Sen. Daniel Webster’s
denunciation of South Carolina’s actions, CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 482 (1850)
(statement of Sen. Daniel Webster); and Sen. Henry Clay’s recounting of Hoar’s experience,
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1850) (statement of Sen. Henry Clay); and remarks
of Rep. Charles Hudson explaining Justice Johnson’s decision in Elkison and South Carolina’s
efforts to block consideration of such issues by the United States Supreme Court, CONG.
GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418–19 (1849) (statement of Sen. Henry Clay).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 166–77.
93 For a thorough account of the intellectual history of antebellum slavery and tariff dis-
putes, see MANISHA SINHA, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SLAVERY: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY
IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (2000). Sinha demonstrates that the nullification doctrine
was rooted in a “separatist ideology based on the values of slavery and a rigorous critique
of democracy, rather than democratic and republican principles.” Id. at 2–3. This separatist
ideology, in turn, provided support for preservation of state sovereignty even in the face of
countervailing constitutional rights and federal laws. Id.
94 Id. at 10.
95 Id. at 16.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 14–16, 19–26.
98 See FREDERIC BANCROFT, CALHOUN AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA NULLIFICATION
MOVEMENT 39–41 (1928).
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people of each State”99 countered by Webster’s declaration that “we cannot have one
rule or one law for South Carolina, and another for other States.”100 While the debate
eventually yielded to Senator Henry Clay’s work as the “Great Compromiser,”101 the
competing visions of sovereignty remained formally unresolved.102
C. “Privileges” and “Immunities”
Debates about national sovereignty described above help to explain why those
who framed the Fourteenth Amendment would have cared about assuring that
national laws could be fully enforced against recalcitrant states. For purposes of
constitutional interpretation, however, that history only becomes meaningful in
relationship to the amendments adopted following the Civil War. In particular, the
question is whether the rule that “[n]o [s]tate[s] shall . . . abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States”103 could be reasonably understood to
mean that state sovereignty must yield to federal law. That conclusion follows from
the general consensus described below, that antebellum understanding of those
terms generally referred to a body of law issued by a specific governing authority
without regard to the “constitutional” or “statutory” nature of the laws themselves.
In other words, privileges or immunities of United States citizens would have been
generally understood as a reference to both statutory and constitutional rights es-
tablished by the federal government.
Antebellum understanding of the words “privileges” or “immunities” begins
with Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, assuring that “Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”104
Prior to the Civil War, no Supreme Court opinions had authoritatively construed that
provision.105 In Corfield v. Coryell,106 however, Justice Bushrod Washington, acting
as circuit judge, provided pages of dicta regarding the scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.107 Given the paucity of alternative resources, Corfield became
99 9 REG. DEB. 274 (1833).
100 9 REG. DEB. 560 (1833).
101 See MARGARET L. COIT, JOHN C. CALHOUN: AMERICAN PORTRAIT 292 (1950).
102 Dramas over slavery issues, tariff disputes, and state authority to nullify federal law
tell only a part of the story regarding constitutional disputes that affected subsequent debates
over the need for clarifying amendments. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (explaining that Georgia violated national law involving regulation of prop-
erty and relationships with Indian nations, but concluding that the Justices lacked jurisdiction
to resolve the dispute).
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
105 Rich, supra note 71, at 606–07 n.323.
106 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320).
107 David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” on the
Eve of the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1127 (2016).
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a common measure of those terms.108 Unfortunately, his opinion became known as
much for the confusion it generated as for the guidance it provided.109
The case before Justice Washington involved the question of whether New
Jersey constables could lawfully seize a boat without becoming liable for trespass
when a person from another state owned that boat and used it to illegally gather
oysters within New Jersey waters.110 Justice Washington eventually dismissed the
case on jurisdictional grounds.111 Before doing so, he asserted that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV did not require absolute equality of citizens and non-
citizens.112 A state could have ownership interests that inured to the benefit of its
own residents;113 the Privileges and Immunities Clause only attached when states reg-
ulated interests “which [were], in their nature, fundamental.”114 Examples Washington
gave included “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety,”115 but
he subjected these rights “to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe
for the general good of the whole.”116 Other examples identified by Washington in-
cluded the right to pursue a trade or profession, to be protected by habeas corpus, and
to be “exempt from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens
of the state.”117
Although in subsequent debates, advocates cited Corfield for the proposition that
“privileges” and “immunities” only included “fundamental” rights,118 that depiction
provided minimal guidance and also ignored Washington’s references to equal treat-
ment of citizens from other states and judicial deference to legislative judgments.119
As recently explained by Professor Kurt Lash, focus on Justice Washington’s
reference to “fundamental” interests misses the more prevalent antebellum interpre-
tation of Article IV, Section 2 as protection for principles of equality or comity,
extending to the “privileges and immunities (whatever they might be) accorded in
each [state] to its own citizens.”120
108 Id. at 1127–28.
109 Id. at 1138.
110 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 555.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 551–52.
113 Id. at 552.
114 Id. at 551.
115 Id. at 551–52.
116 Id. at 552.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117–18 (1866) (statement of Rep.
James Wilson).
119 See Corfield, 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
120 See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMU-
NITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 165 & n.390 (2014) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 293 (1866)); see also id. at 45–46 (describing a consensus that the Privileges and
1192 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1179
Cases other than Corfield illustrated this emphasis on equality. For example, a
Maryland court decision from 1797 concluded that alternative attachment proceed-
ings for out-of-state citizens violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,121 noting
that real and personal property rights should be protected “in the same manner” for
citizens of all states.122 Justice Joseph Yates, serving on New York’s highest court,
similarly rejected challenges to a state monopoly,123 explaining that the law applied
to citizens both within and outside of the state and “until a discrimination is made,
no constitutional barrier does exist.”124 A Kentucky court emphasized both the
fundamental nature of privileges and immunities and their source in state law, de-
scribing them as “common to the citizens of any State under its constitution and
constitutional laws.”125 Justice Joseph Story, whose Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion represented the best extant summary of prevailing constitutional doctrine,126
reinforced an understanding of Article IV based upon comity,127 and extended a
“general citizenship” so that citizens from out of state shared “all the privileges and
immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under the like
circumstances.”128 In subsequent debates in Congress, Representative Michael Kerr
summed up this understanding with his statement that “the privileges and immunities
referred to as attainable in the States are required to be attained, if at all, according
to the laws or constitutions of the States, and never in defiance of them.”129
Other nineteenth-century legal texts, in addition to Article IV, used the terms
“privileges” and “immunities.”130 Treaties and descriptions of the rights of residents
within territories of the United States also demonstrate the traditional understanding of
these terms.131 Within these contexts, Congress linked privileges and immunities along
with references to “rights,” “advantages,” or “liberties” to the status of United States
Immunities Clause differed from state to state, involving a body of state law to be extended
as a matter of comity rather than a fixed identification of “fundamental” rights).
121 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554, 562 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1797).
122 Id. at 554.
123 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 547, 560–61 (1812) (opinion of Yates, J.),
overruled by N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (1825).
124 Id. at 561. Chief Justice James Kent made the same point: “The provision that the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states . . . means only that citizens of other states shall have equal rights with our own
citizens . . . .” Id. at 577 (opinion of Kent, C.J.).
125 Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 219 (1851).
126 See Arthur E. Sutherland, Introduction to 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES v–vi, viii, x (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
127 See 3 STORY, supra note 126, at 674–75.
128 Id. at 675.
129 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1866).
130 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 821–22 (2010) (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
131 Id. at 821–27.
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citizenship.132 The treaty with Spain involving acquisition of Florida guaranteed
those inhabitants “the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities, of the
citizens of the United States.”133 Comparable language appeared in the Louisiana Ces-
sion Act of 1803134 and in an 1843 treaty with the Stockbridge Tribe of Native Ameri-
cans.135 Africans aboard the Spanish ship, The Amistad, represented by John Quincy
Adams,136 gained United States Supreme Court recognition of “the privileges, and
immunities, and rights belonging to bona fide subjects of Spain, under our treaties
or laws.”137 And in 1867, the same Congress that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
also ratified a treaty with Russia providing Alaska inhabitants (other than “uncivilized
native tribes”) “enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States.”138 As explained by Senator Lyman Trumbull when advocating
support for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, such language “entitled [the respective
populations] to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, and shall
in all respects be subject to the laws of the United States.”139
Use of the terms “privileges” or “immunities” when interpreting the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, in treaty references, or found in other contexts,140
illustrated the basic point that the words did not embody a recognized collection of
fundamental rights.141 Instead, the key to understanding began with identification of
132 These terms tended to be used interchangeably, without specific significance tied to
the individual words. See LASH, supra note 120, at 14 (noting countless late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century examples of such interchangeable use); Michael Kent Curtis,
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citi-
zens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1095 (2000) (noting interchangeable use of
the words “rights” and “privileges”).
133 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, art. VI, Oct. 24, 1820–Feb. 19, 1821, 8 Stat. 252.
134 Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., art. III,
Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 (providing that “inhabitants of the ceded territory” shall enjoy “all
the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States”).
135 HENRY WHEATON & WILLIAM BEACH LAWRENCE, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
899–900 (2d ann. ed. 1863) (guaranteeing every member of the tribe “all rights, privileges,
and immunities of [United States] citizens”).
136 United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 518–19, 566 (1841).
137 Id. at 595–96 (freeing slaves who had revolted while being transported to Cuba).
138 Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, U.S.-Russ., art. III,
Mar. 30–June 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542. See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 821–27 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring), for additional references.
139 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866) (citing the Stockbridge Treaty).
140 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 606 (1834) (using the phrase “privileges
and immunities” in a reference to arguments by counsel addressing copyright claims of the
official reporter of federal cases); United States v. Webster, 28 F. Cas. 509, 516 (D. Me.
1840) (No. 16,658) (referring to “privileges and immunities” in reference to contractual rights
of a quartermaster who sought pay for unusual services).
141 See LASH, supra note 120, at 12.
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the applicable legal authority. Courts and lawmakers used comparable combinations
of words to represent a principle of equal application of a related body of law.142
Much as the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV extended rights based
upon state law to citizens from other states,143 various treaties promised that new
inhabitants would receive equal treatment under applicable laws of the United
States.144 None of these references included narrow or precise definitions of terms,145
and none distinguished between “statutory” and “constitutional” rights.146 Given this
background, consistent construction of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause depends upon identification of a comparable federal source for
the rights in question.
II. “PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS”
When the nation began, concerns of those framing the Constitution focused on
constraining the federal government with an enumerated list of congressional
powers.147 By the end of the Civil War, eighteenth-century concerns about constrain-
ing the national government had shifted to the importance of assuring that the na-
tional government had adequate authority to protect federal rights.148 The post-war
amendments reflected that shift.149 Congressional debates, contemporaneous legisla-
tion, judicial decisions, and constitutional commentary all demonstrate a general
understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected those rights as
defined by the Constitution and laws of the United States government.150 A review
of each of those sources demonstrates that federal statutory rights belong within the
category of privileges or immunities of United States citizens.
A. Congressional Debates
Many of those who have written about interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have discussed in detail the extensive recorded debates that took place during
the process of promulgation.151 They have often focused on the question of whether
142 See id. at 12–13.
143 See, e.g., Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 561 (1812) (opinion of Yates, J.),
overruled by N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (1825).
144 See, e.g., supra notes 133–34, 138.
145 See LASH, supra note 120, at 15.
146 See id. at 13.
147 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1202 (1992).
148 See id. at 1217.
149 See id.
150 See discussion infra Part II.
151 See, e.g., LASH, supra note 120, at 176–229; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the
Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–
67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1532–1614 (2007).
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the phrase “privileges or immunities” included the Bill of Rights,152 and the most
thorough recent assessments of that question conclude that the answer should have
been “yes,”153 while also acknowledging that the phrase should not be limited to that
list.154 The United States Supreme Court Justices, however, have sent the clear mes-
sage that they have moved beyond the incorporation debate.155
Diverted by questions about incorporation and natural law, however, few scholars
have studied the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment would have been
understood to include individual rights protected by federal statutes.156 Kurt Lash
sidestepped that issue in an otherwise thorough assessment of the “Privileges and
Immunities of American Citizenship.” He documents the “escalating public awareness
that adopting the Privileges or Immunities Clause would bind the states to protect
substantive rights such as those listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitu-
tion.”157 With respect to federal statutes, however, he finds “nothing clearly incorrect
about including statutorily established rights as a portion of the constitutionally secured
‘privileges or immunities’ of citizens of the United States,”158 but questions whether
that is “the best reading of the Clause only because the discussions of national privi-
leges and immunities in 1866 focused on constitutionally secured personal rights.”159
152 See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and
Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
153, 154–56 (2009).
153 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
xiv–xv (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8–9 (1986); LASH, supra note 120, at vii; Wildenthal,
supra note 151, at 1510; Wildenthal, supra note 152, at 321.
154 If the phrase “privileges or immunities” only included the Bill of Rights, then the framers
would not have used the vague alternative language. At the very least, congressional power
to enforce other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Contracts Clause or Bill of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto clauses of Article I, Section 10, would also have been included.
Evidence also suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment secured congressional authority to
enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 115–23
(1988); Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr.
Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 891–94 (1982) (arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a range of rights set out in the Constitution).
155 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting arguments that the Second Amendment should be incorporated into the Privileges
or Immunities Clause based upon “settled doctrine” and accepting arguments that the Second
Amendment should be incorporated through the Due Process Clause).
156 But see William J. Rich, Why “Privileges or Immunities”? An Explanation of the
Framers’ Intent, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1111, 1126–27 (2009).
157 LASH, supra note 120, at 226.
158 Id. at 263.
159 Id. Other authors take a somewhat similarly cautious approach to the question about
whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects rights that extend beyond the Bill of Rights.
See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
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That conclusion, however, conflicts with the antebellum interpretation of references
to privileges and immunities that Lash carefully documents.160
Viewpoints of key participants in congressional debates support a conception
of national sovereignty consistent with the importance of securing consistent en-
forcement of federal law in all states.161 They began their political careers immersed
in the series of state sovereignty claims that had provoked constitutional crises in
years leading up to the Civil War.162 They had to have been conscious of the nullifi-
cation debates, and they understood the full import of Webster’s argument in the
“Great Debate”163 that, “No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the
[C]onstitution or any law of the United States.”164 They would have been aware of
efforts by John Quincy Adams to assert federal supremacy in response to repeated
assertions by John C. Calhoun, Roger Taney, and others that states had an inherent
right to nullify federal law.165
Frequent references to Judge Hoar’s mission to South Carolina underscore this
point.166 Some have treated references to the Hoar affair as evidence that, when
103 YALE L.J. 57, 70–71 (1993) (noting John Bingham’s repeated references to the need for
federal authority to enforce, “at a minimum,” the Bill of Rights).
160 See LASH, supra note 120, at 45–46:
the gist of the consensus view was that the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the states differed from state to state; what was expected
was that a certain subset of these privileges would be extended as a
matter of comity and constitutional requirement to visiting citizens of
other states.
161 See infra notes 164–65.
162 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 671–79 (2003).
163 The “Great Debate” refers to the “debate over the question of the right of a state to
secede.” William I. Schaffer, Daniel Webster—The Lawyer, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 3, 49 (1932). For
more on Daniel Webster’s role in this debate, see generally id. at 48–50.
164 6 REG. DEB. 78 (1830).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 83–102. Congressman John Bingham, a protégé
of Daniel Webster and the person most responsible for framing the Fourteenth Amendment and
guiding it through the House of Representatives, obviously cared about these issues. See LASH,
supra note 120, at 83 (describing Webster as John Bingham’s “political hero”). In 1859,
Bingham tried in vain to convince the House of Representatives to deny Oregon admission
to the United States because of a clause in the proposed state constitution excluding entry by
African Americans, saying, “I deny that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of the
United States from coming within its Territory . . . or from the enjoyment therein of the ‘privi-
leges and immunities’ of a citizen of the United States.” CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess.
984 (1859). Bingham lost his argument that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution precluded
such state laws. See id. at 983–84. In 1862, in the midst of a debate about funding the Union
Army, Congressman Bingham again stressed the importance of federal supremacy: “The
Republic can no more live without its supreme law duly obeyed or duly enforced than can
its citizens who compose it live without air.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1862).
166 In 1866, in a speech before Congress in support of an amendment to the Constitution
that would protect the “equal rights of every man,” Congressman Bingham denounced the
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Congress promulgated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, members of Congress had in mind Hoar’s freedom of speech and his right to
petition the South Carolina government.167 But Hoar’s speech and petition rights tell
only a part of the story. He did not travel to South Carolina just to give a speech.
Hoar’s trip came about in response to South Carolina’s laws that jailed free black
seamen in defiance of Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause protections of the right
to navigate freely in and out of Charleston Harbor.168 We may logically assume that
Hoar did not just want the right to file such lawsuits; he intended to succeed. In
Elkison v. Deliesseline, Justice Johnson declared that South Carolina violated the
“paramount and exclusive right” of Congress to regulate commerce.169 As Senator
Sherman explained, the incident showed the need for effective enforcement of federal
rights against states.170 Individuals lacked the ability to enforce federal law against
state authorities; as understood at the time, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities Clause assured that such problems would never arise again.171
Members of Congress made additional references to their concern for federal
supremacy during the course of debates over the Fourteenth Amendment.172 For
lack of safety for “a citizen of Massachusetts . . . to be found anywhere in the streets of
Charleston” and he went on to decry the “utter[ ] disregard[ ]” of South Carolina for the priv-
ileges and immunities of “the honored representative of Massachusetts.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 157–58 (1866). Bingham later explained that South Carolina had required that
citizens “abjure their allegiance to every other government or authority than that of the State
of South Carolina,” which led to the situation in which both citizen and stranger lacked
“protection by national law from unconstitutional State enactments.” Id. at 2542–43. Examples
from other members of Congress include Congressman John Broomall’s lament that,
Strange as it may seem, while the Government of the United States has
been held competent to protect the lowest menial of the minister of the
most obscure prince in Europe, anywhere between the two oceans, and
from the Lakes to the Gulf, it had no power to protect the personal liberty
of the agent of the State of Massachusetts in the city of Charleston, or
enable him to sue in the State courts.
Id. at 1263; Senator George Edmunds’ reference to the time “when Mr. Hoar went down [to
South Carolina] in order to give some rights to citizens and was driven away,” CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1001 (1869); and Senator Trumbull’s discussion of the competence of
Congress to pass a law protecting Judge Hoar in his travel to South Carolina, CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). In his chronicle of the Reconstruction Debates, Alfred Avins
notes thirteen separate references to the “Hoar incident in South Carolina.” See THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPO-
RARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 748 (Alfred
Avins ed., 1967).
167 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 153, at 236, 261, 301.
168 See Hamer, supra note 87, at 22.
169 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
170 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41–42 (1865).
171 See Aynes, supra note 159, at 71–73 (noting John Bingham’s repeated references to
the need for federal authority to enforce, “at a minimum,” the Bill of Rights).
172 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1866).
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example, in addressing questions about enforcement of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Congressman Baker quoted the text of that provision and asked:
What business is it of any State to do the things here forbidden?
To rob the American citizen of rights thrown around him by the
supreme law of the land? When we remember to what an extent
this has been done in the past, we can appreciate the need of
putting a stop to it in the future.173
In historical context, Baker’s reference would have been understood as an appeal to
reinforce federal supremacy. No one seriously challenged that element of the debate
in 1866, precisely because participants accepted the view that Daniel Webster and John
Quincy Adams won their debates with John C. Calhoun and Roger Taney.174 As noted
in March of 1866 by Congressman George Latham, “No one, I presume, doubts the
power of Congress to place all the inhabitants of the United States upon an equal
footing as to all matters within the legitimate scope of congressional legislation.”175
In sum, congressional debates included statements consistent with an inclusive
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, reinforcing federal supremacy
with respect to enforcement of statutory rights while also extending federal power
to enforcement of additional constitutional guarantees.176 It should be acknowledged
that language from those debates could also be found to support alternative perspec-
tives.177 It would be a mistake, however, to place too much emphasis upon state-
ments by members of Congress made in the course of a vigorous debate. Debate
references provide little more than a starting place for the discussion.
B. Contemporaneous Legislation
Efforts to construe the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrate the difficulty, if not
the futility, of trying to determine “legislative intent” based purely upon references
to statements made in the heat of the battle.178 To the extent that the original under-
standing of text matters within the context of constitutional interpretation, however,
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
175 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295 (1866); see also Kenyon D. Bunch, The
Original Understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: Michael Perry’s Justi-
fication for Judicial Activism or Robert Bork’s Constitutional Inkblot?, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 321, 416 (2000) (noting that “a constitution-amending majority” readily accepted
the proposition that Congress has such power).
176 See supra notes 151–74 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 151–74 and accompanying text.
178 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 30 (2012) (asserting that “[s]ubjective intent is beside the point”).
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a more consistent and reliable picture emerges from a review of contemporaneous
enactments by Congress in which the same words appeared. Congress repeatedly
referred to “privileges” and “immunities” in legislation designed to reinforce the
constitutional amendments,179 and in doing so consistently tied those terms to federal
laws in addition to provisions of the Constitution.180
We know from the study of antebellum constitutional disputes that enforcement
of federal law often floundered upon lack of jurisdiction.181 Enforcement of the newly
enacted constitutional amendments, therefore, required adjustments to federal court
jurisdiction.182 Habeas corpus jurisdiction needed to change in part to assure that
persons being held in an equivalent to slavery could seek release from unlawful con-
straint, and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 provided that relief.183 The same session
of Congress that promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment included language in that
Act expanding Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases decided by the highest courts
of the various states if that court questions “the validity of a treaty or statute . . . of
the United States” or “where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under
the constitution, or any treaty or statute of . . . the United States” if a state court
rejected that claim.184 In 1875, Congress enacted a general federal question statute
to assure that any claim based upon either the Constitution or a federal statute could
be brought in federal court.185
Other contemporaneous statutes included comparable text in reference to de-
velopment of valid enforcement statutes. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 conferred
citizenship on former slaves and protected the rights of “such citizens” to “full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens.”186 Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto of that
Act after a debate that hinged largely upon questions about congressional power.187
Subsequently, Congress reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as Section 18 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870.188 The text of that act prohibited conspiracies of two or
179 See infra notes 184, 189, 194–95, 197, 204 and accompanying text.
180 See infra notes 193–203 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 497–98 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
182 See id.
183 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)).
The reason why Justice Johnson could not protect the rights of Harry Elkison stemmed from
the lack of such jurisdiction. See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 497–98. For discussion of the link be-
tween habeas corpus and slavery, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866)
(statement of Edgar Cowan).
184 14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)) (emphasis added).
185 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)).
186 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
187 See John Hope Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
1135, 1135–36 (1990).
188 16 Stat. 141 (1870).
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more persons which threatened a citizen’s “enjoyment of any right or privilege
granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”189
Changes in federal jurisdiction which came about after the Civil War “reshaped
the understanding of federalism and, in particular, the federal courts’ role in the
enforcement of civil rights.”190 An anonymous critic from the year in which Con-
gress established federal question jurisdiction explained that statute “as the culmina-
tion of a movement which began with the removal legislation of 1864 to strengthen
the Federal Government against the states.”191 In every one of those changes to
federal jurisdiction, Congress recognized statutory rights within the scope of privi-
leges or immunities that federal courts would henceforth protect.
In response to continuing violations of civil rights,192 Congress enacted the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871193 to reinforce provisions of both the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, imposing liability on persons who, “under color of any law . . .
cause . . . the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States.”194 A separate section of the same act prohibited
conspiracies to deprive “any person or any class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws.”195 An 1874 Com-
mittee on Revision of the Laws that had been appointed to overhaul all federal law,
making “such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile the contradictions, supply
the omissions, and amend the imperfections of the original text,” modified the first
clause of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.196 As reenacted, the Ku Klux Klan Act
provision that eventually became 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protected United States citizens
from deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws” of the federal government.197
Did the addition of the words “and laws” change the meaning of the Ku Klux Klan
Act in a significant manner that should also alter our understanding of the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, or did the committee follow its instructions by pro-
viding consistency, curing omissions, and thereby perfecting the text? Congressman
Bingham, who sponsored the Act in Congress, explained that it would provide for better
enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the United States.198 Viewed in terms
189 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (emphasis added).
190 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 216 (5th ed. 2000).
191 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 n.34 (1928).
192 For a historical account, see WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION,
1869–1879 (1979); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974).
193 17 Stat. 15 (1871).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 13.
196 Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 2, 14 Stat. 74, 75, amended by Act of May 4, 1870,
ch. 72, 16 Stat. 96.
197 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (emphasis added).
198 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1871).
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of the broader statutory context, the addition of those two words brought the text into
conformity with other contemporaneous legislation, including the Civil Rights Act
of 1866,199 the Enforcement Act of 1870,200 and the acts expanding federal jurisdic-
tion.201 Addition of the reference to federal laws also eliminated ambiguity that could
arise from the reference to “privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution;”202
it would be reasonable to ask whether the Constitution “secured” federal statutes that
fell within the scope of the Supremacy Clause, and addition of the words “and laws”
answered such questions. All of this helps to establish a broader point: By 1874,
Congress had repeatedly linked the terms “privileges or immunities” with federal
statutes, with no suggestion that those terms differed in content from the Fourteenth
Amendment reference to “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”203
The failure of judges, advocates, and scholars to focus upon this conclusion,
however, obscures the clarity of the answer. It may be possible to argue that statu-
tory references to “rights,” “privileges,” or “immunities” secured by the “Constitution
or laws of the United States” referred to a different body of laws when compared to
the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. It may also be possible to argue that the words “privileges and
immunities” used in Article IV had a different character when compared to the same
words used in the Fourteenth Amendment, so that the words pertaining to state citizens
included statutory rights, but the Fourteenth Amendment did not. It seems more
likely, however, that twentieth-century observers ignored this issue based upon an
assumption that it was irrelevant; the Supremacy Clause eliminated the need to revisit
questions about the enforcement of federal rights, especially when accompanied by
the assumption that Daniel Webster and his cohorts had won the Great Debate.
Additional assessment of case law and commentary reinforces this explanation.
C. Contemporaneous Judicial Interpretations
In the years surrounding enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, questions
continued to be raised and resolved with respect to the meaning of constitutionally
protected privileges and immunities. As previously noted, antebellum references to
“rights,” “privileges,” or “immunities” had been commonly understood to protect
equal government treatment regardless of the constitutional or legislative source of
those laws.204 The United States Supreme Court illustrated this understanding in the
same year that the Fourteenth Amendment became law. In Paul v. Virginia,205 Justice
199 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 184, 189 192–95, 197 and accompanying text.
203 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra notes 184, 189, 192–95, 197 and accom-
panying text.
204 See LASH, supra note 120, at 45–47. For discussion, see supra notes 120–46 and
accompanying text.
205 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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Stephen Field rejected arguments that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2 encompassed a body of substantive law to which states must adhere.206
Instead, he reaffirmed the more established explanation that Article IV places all
citizens upon “the same footing with citizens of other States” with respect to privileges
or immunities derived from the “constitution and laws” of the forum state.207
In the first United States Supreme Court case to construe the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases208 argued that Louisiana should
not be allowed to force a group of private butchers in New Orleans to carry out their
activities within a state-established slaughterhouse.209 Opponents of the law relied
upon the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, with limited
references to other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.210 They did not argue
for incorporation of the Bill of Rights.211 Instead, they argued in effect that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause transformed the Supreme Court into a general
guardian of common law contract and property rights,212 an approach that would
have taken the Court in the opposite direction from that adopted in Paul v. Virginia.
In rejecting their challenge, Justice Samuel Miller explained that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause prohibited state interference with rights of United States
citizens derived from federal law in the same way that the content of privileges and
immunities protected by Article IV arises out of positive state law.213 Drawing from
this analogy, Miller concluded that the substantive scope of privileges or immunities
of United States citizens should be determined by reference to federal sources of law
rather than through enforcement of judicially defined inherent rights.214 In reaching
this conclusion, Miller’s opinion remained in tune with the understanding that the
terms “privileges” and “immunities” refer to a body of law establishing significant
rights and derived from a given governmental authority.215
206 Id. at 177–81.
207 Id. at 180; see also Downham v. Alexandria Council, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173, 175
(1869) (noting “[i]t is only equality of privileges and immunities between citizens of
different States that the Constitution guarantees”).
208 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Prior to the Supreme Court interpretation of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, lower courts had also considered the issue. In the first recorded
lower court opinion, Judge Luther Day for the Ohio Supreme Court had explained that the
clause included those privileges or immunities “derived from, or recognized by, the constitution
of the United States.” Ohio ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 210 (1871).
209 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59–60.
210 Id. at 51–56 (arguing against the monopoly).
211 See id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 76–77 (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not give
federal courts control over state government decisions regarding “the rights of its own citizens”).
214 Id. at 78–79 (explaining that, in comparison, the Fourteenth Amendment refers to
privileges and immunities which are under the care of Congress).
215 Id.
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Generations of American lawyers, however, learned about Slaughter-House as
a case that failed to live up to promises of federal protection for individual rights,
but otherwise lacked importance.216 Commentators focused upon what the case
failed to do, rather than on its merits.217 The criticism looks good in hindsight; sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions rejected incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and critics charged that Slaughter-House opened
the door for those decisions.218 Casting blame in that manner, however, distorts the
text of Miller’s opinion and ignores a more reasonable assessment of the Slaughter-
House framework.219
In recent years, a number of constitutional scholars have rejected the traditional,
pejorative assessment of Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House.220 As Laurence
Tribe explained:
It was only a series of later decisions that oddly attributed to
Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
the expulsion of the Bill of Rights from the privileges or immu-
nities cathedral, an expulsion nowhere to be found on the face of
the Miller opinion and indeed inconsistent with much of its
language and logic.221
216 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 1020 (1998) (stating that “no one in the legal academy thinks it very im-
portant to explain [the Privileges or Immunities Clause]”).
217 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 55 (1997) (characterizing Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House as
“probably the worst holding, in its effect on human rights, ever uttered by the Supreme
Court”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 166 (1990) (comparing the clause to a provision “written in Sanskrit or . . . obliterated
past deciphering by an ink blot”); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1119 (1953) (labeling judicial
interpretation of the clause “completely nugatory and useless”).
218 See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 628 (1994)
(arguing that “almost all sources” agree that the Court misinterpreted the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause).
219 For a more favorable view of Justice Miller’s perspective in Slaughter-House, see
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 202–03, 206, 208, 210 (2003) (describing
Justice Miller’s background as a physician, his support for public health measures, and his
support for the biracial government in Louisiana that enacted the slaughterhouse regulations).
220 See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinter-
pretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000); Robert C. Palmer,
The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 750 (1984); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost
Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1111–15 (2000).
221 Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV.
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By distorting Justice Miller’s opinion with respect to the issue of incorporation,
traditionalists also failed to recognize implications of the Slaughter-House frame-
work with respect to application of federal law more generally.
The core of the conflict between Justice Miller and dissenting Justices, led by
Justice Stephen Field,222 involved the question of authority to recognize rights that
had no roots in either constitutional text or federal statutes.223 Foreshadowing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York,224 Field sought to “incorporate”
citizen entitlement to “all pursuits, all professions, all avocations . . . open without
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age,
sex, and condition.”225 He based his argument upon references to the common law
and libertarian theory, citing Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations as authority.226 In
rejecting Field’s approach, Miller remained faithful to the vision of the Fourteenth
Amendment repeatedly described by John Bingham and the moderate Republicans
during prior congressional debates.227
The Slaughter-House debate simply did not involve incorporation of the Bill of
Rights,228 even though subsequent criticism focused upon that claim.229 The most
direct reference to the Bill of Rights came from Justice Miller’s use of First Amendment
text as an example of the privileges or immunities that warranted protection.230 Miller
argued that plaintiffs’ arguments would trigger a major shift in state and federal rela-
tionships, making the national government a “perpetual censor” of the common law,231
110, 183–84 (1999). To underscore Tribe’s point, note that when William Guthrie addressed
this issue in 1898, the argument for incorporating the first eight amendments into the Privileges
or Immunities Clause had “either not [been] made or was inadequately presented” in all prior Su-
preme Court cases. WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 63 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
222 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 99–100.
224 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (adopting the doctrine of “substantive due process” to protect a
right to freedom of contract).
225 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110.
226 Id. at 110 n.*.
227 In order to assure moderate Republican support of civil rights acts and constitutional
amendments after the Civil War, participants in the congressional debates provided repeated
assurances that changes limited federal power within a traditional sphere of national authority,
extended to include rights identified in the constitutional text, but without opening a door for
federal control over a panoply of civil rights beyond that scope. See, e.g., James Wilson’s re-
sponse to concerns by Bingham and others that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 related only “to
matters within the control of Congress.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866); see
also LASH, supra note 120, at 152 (describing Bingham’s commitment to dual sovereignty).
228 See generally Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
229 See, e.g., supra note 220 and accompanying text.
230 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (majority opinion) (referring to the “right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances”).
231 Id. at 78.
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and that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to bring about that
result.232 Miller’s opinion for the Court protected community rights to remove
“noxious slaughter-houses”233 from city centers and to generally protect the “conve-
nience, health, and comfort of the people,”234 and he upheld the state’s decision to
establish a monopoly designed to achieve those ends.235
Critics of Slaughter-House generally ignore overtones of pre–Civil War debates
that accompanied the case as it arrived on the Court’s docket. John A. Campbell, a for-
mer Supreme Court Justice and disciple of John C. Calhoun236 who had helped to up-
hold slavery in Dred Scott v. Sanford,237 represented the Slaughter-House petitioners.238
In contrast, lead counsel for Louisiana held a “passionate personal attachment to Daniel
Webster,”239 and had organized an armed force to support President Jackson’s anti-
nullification efforts.240
Campbell attempted to use defeat in the Civil War to his advantage, arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment had “forever destroyed” the states’ rights doctrine of
Calhoun.241 He asked the Court to recognize an “indefinite enlargement” of resulting
federal power.242 He made that argument, however, to assert private property rights in
a manner that paralleled antebellum support for the property rights of slave holders.243
The “enlargement” he sought involved the very concerns about expansion of federal
powers that moderate Republicans had opposed during Fourteenth Amendment con-
gressional debates.244
In contrast, lawyers for the slaughterhouse monopoly argued before the Supreme
Court of Louisiana that efforts to overturn Louisiana law echoed the “dangerous
doctrine”245 by which “people were urged to nullify the tariff laws of Congress,
232 Id.
233 Id. at 64.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 64–66. Although less eloquent, Miller’s opinion for the majority in Slaughter-
House came to the same conclusion that Justice Holmes reached a generation later with his
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236 See Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughterhouse Cases, 18
TUL. L. REV. 1, 88 (1943) (citing RANDELL HUNT, SELECTED ARGUMENTS, LECTURES AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF RANDELL HUNT xviii–xix (1876)).
237 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 493–518 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring) (stating a theory of
state supremacy over “property,” and denouncing congressional claims of “supreme and
irresponsible power . . . over boundless territories”).
238 Franklin, supra note 236, at 52.
239 Id.
240 Id. (describing background of Christian Roselius, Randell Hunt, and William H. Hunt).
241 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 52 (1872) (argument of Plaintiffs’ counsel).
242 Id. at 52–53.
243 See LASH, supra note 120, at 37–38.
244 Id. at 160 (explaining the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment left “the gen-
eral regulation of unenumerated individual rights to the . . . states”).
245 See Franklin, supra note 236, at 87 (citing HUNT, supra note 236, at 91–92).
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because it was pretended that those laws tended to create a monopoly.”246 Justice
Miller also made reference to concerns about nullification,247 but in his opinion he
characterized petitioners’ argument as an effort to give the Court “authority to
nullify such [legislation] as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they
existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment.”248
In opposing the plaintiffs’ argument for constitutional recognition of a right to
free enterprise, Justice Miller ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had not
expanded federal authority to control substantive rights derived from the common
law.249 Responsibility for determining the content of state privileges and immunities
remained with the states,250 and Article IV, Section 2 continued to be a comity clause
rather than a source for protecting inherent rights.251 The Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause would play a comparable role by assuring enforce-
ment of federal law in all states.252 By reaching this decision, Miller closed the door
to a literally defensible but expansive vision of individual rights,253 while emphasiz-
ing the open door to federal enforcement of rights based upon the Constitution or
laws of the United States.254
D. The Slaughter-House Framework
The framework of the Privileges or Immunities Clause described by Justice Miller
differs markedly from the common caricature of the opinion. With a series of exam-
ples, Miller identified four potential sources of federal privileges or immunities.255 They
could be based upon (1) constitutional text that specifically limited the states (exam-
ples including bans on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, or laws that impair con-
tract rights);256 (2) implied or structural rights, such as the right to travel;257 (3) rights
found in the first eight amendments to the Constitution (exemplified by the “right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances” drawn explicitly from
246 Id.
247 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
248 Id. (emphasis added).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 75.
252 Id.
253 See D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4
IOWA L. BULL. 219, 226 (1918) (noting that “a literal interpretation of the clause . . . would
have resulted in extreme centralization, leaving to State governments little more than admin-
istrative functions”).
254 Id.
255 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77, 79.
256 Id. at 77 (referencing “the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and
laws impairing the obligations of contracts”).
257 Id. at 79 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867), for the implied right
to travel “to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government”).
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the text of the First Amendment);258 or (4) rights established through the exercise of
congressional and executive power as defined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion (referenced in terms of the “right to use the navigable waters of the United
States”) and in Article II, Section 2 (described by Miller as “all rights secured to our
citizens by treaties with foreign nations”).259 All of his illustrations supported the
more general proposition that federal privileges or immunities “owe[d] their existence
to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”260
In listing these rights, Justice Miller carefully noted that these were suggestions,
and were never intended to be an exclusive list.261 In doing so, he emphasized the
potential breadth of such interests while distinguishing between rights enacted by
states and those derived from the national government or from constitutional text.262
By referencing both treaty rights and laws regulating navigable waters, Miller
explicitly recognized the authority of other government branches to determine the
specific scope of the rights in question.263 Furthermore, Miller’s rejection of the
plaintiffs’ claims and his distinctions from the rights identified in Corfield had
nothing to do with the nature of the rights, and everything to do with the source of
authority to establish the rights in question.264 The parallel he drew between Article IV
and the Fourteenth Amendment could not have been more clear.
Justice Field’s dissenting opinion questioned this analysis, arguing that such a
limited scope added little to the pre-existing Supremacy Clause,265 and was therefore
too narrow an interpretation for the Privileges or Immunities Clause.266 By leaving
the door open for incorporation of the Bill of Rights along with other protective
provisions of the Constitution that had not previously been viewed as within the
scope of national sovereign authority,267 however, Miller’s approach paralleled com-






263 Id. at 79–80.
264 Id. at 75–76.
265 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
266 Id.
267 David S. Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House: The Cases’ Support for Civil Rights,
42 AKRON L. REV. 1129, 1140 (2009).
268 There are good reasons for believing that Miller understood and shared Bingham’s
vision for the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1871, they traveled together to the west coast, with
Bingham presenting public presentations about the meaning of the Amendment. Aynes,
supra note 218, at 662 (citing THE DIARY OF JUDGE MATTHEW P. DEADY 28 (Malcolm Clark,
Jr. ed., 1975) (entry of July 18, 1871)). While revisionist characterization of Slaughter-House
may depict things differently, text of the opinion supports an interpretation that united
judicial and legislative majority perspectives.
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change brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment assured that states must comply
with all national law, including provisions of the Bill of Rights,269 and that individuals
would have a right to enforce those laws against state governments.270
Most important for purposes of the current discussion, none of the Justices ob-
jected to inclusion of the rights described in Justice Miller’s opinion.271 In their
dissents, Justices Field and Bradley argued for a broader interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but never questioned the controlling nature of federal law.272 Justice
Field explained that “[t]he supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United
States always controlled any State legislation [that interfered with national laws].”273
Justice Bradley was even more effusive regarding this point, noting that “the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment itself [now settled the question] that citizenship of the
United States is the primary citizenship in this country”274 and that a United States
citizen has “an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the
nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.”275 While Field and Bradley wanted more,
including a newly recognized right to choose any lawful employment,276 neither would
have objected to any elements of the Slaughter-House framework described above.
E. Subsequent Court Interpretations
The Supreme Court decision in Slaughter-House represented the opening salvo
in the debate regarding the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Participants in that debate,
however, paid relatively little attention to rights that, in Miller’s terms, “owe their
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws.”277 Instead, the primary focus shifted to questions about judicial identification
of rights that could not be traced to such sources. Litigants tried in vain to argue that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected inherent, fundamental rights without
reference to federal structure, constitution, or legislation.
A notorious case for such arguments came in United States v. Cruikshank,278 in
which the Justices overturned a conviction of defendants charged with conspiring
269 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 67–68 (majority opinion).
270 Id. at 54–55.
271 Justice Stevens emphasized the same point with respect to the “right to travel” that he
relied upon in his opinion for the Court in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999). For
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 343–46.
272 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 112 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 112–13.
276 Id. at 113–14.
277 Id. at 79 (majority opinion).
278 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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to prevent two African Americans from exercising their right of peaceable assembly.279
If any one case deserves blame for steering the Supreme Court in the wrong direction
regarding incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cruikshank best fits that description. Justices in the
majority expressed doubts about the scope of the First Amendment and the extent to
which that Amendment could be relied upon by Congress as a basis for protecting a
right of assembly regarding matters that could not be directly tied to interests of the na-
tional government.280 That language, and the conception of federalism that it reflected,
provided a basis for subsequently rejecting incorporation of the Bill of Rights.281
That incorporation debate, however, should not be allowed to obscure the point
on which all Supreme Court Justices at the time appeared to agree: Privileges and
immunities of United States citizens included those rights protected by federal
statutes.282 The Justices rejected the broad indictment at issue in Cruikshank because
it lacked reference to a specific federal statutory source.283 The Court’s ruling left
wide scope for the federal government to act, including a direction that defendants
could have been charged for violation of federally protected privileges or immuni-
ties if the indictment had specified that the victims had assembled “for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”284 The Court
concluded, however, that on the record before it, defendants in Cruikshank had not
violated any right or privilege “granted or secured . . . by the [C]onstitution or laws
of the United States.”285
Other cases followed the pattern illustrated by Cruikshank. Individuals who
were not members of an organized militia had no Fourteenth Amendment right to
organize as a military unit; in order to claim such a right they “must be able to point
to the provision of the Constitution or statutes of the United States by which it is
conferred.”286 Continuing to apply the Slaughter-House framework, state employee
279 Id. at 556–57.
280 Id. at 552.
281 But see Newsom, supra note 220, at 714–20 (arguing that, in Cruikshank, the Supreme
Court was again not presented with a genuine argument for incorporation).
282 See generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
283 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 562.
284 Id. at 552.
285 Id. at 548 (emphasis added). For contemporary readers, it is also important to under-
stand the limited scope of the First Amendment freedom of speech as understood in the
nineteenth century. At the time when Cruikshank was decided, no Supreme Court opinion
had established anything like a modern conception of freedom of speech. See MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9 (2000) (explaining that “[w]e tend to forget how recent
robust national judicial protection is”). (I also explain the same point in section 5.1 of my
treatise, but not in the same detail. I have tremendous respect for the work of Professor
Curtis, who credits the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for publishing part of the work
that contributed to his book.)
286 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266 (1886) (emphasis added).
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discharge laws,287 foreign attachment rules,288 and state inheritance laws289 all survived
challenges based upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause because the underlying
rights in question could not be traced to the federal government.290 The Supreme
Court rejected repeated invitations to discover privileges or immunities of United
States citizens independently from congressional action or other national sources.291
Along with the Supreme Court rulings rejecting relief based upon the Privileges
or Immunities Clause came a series of decisions affirming recognition of rights,
privileges, or immunities defined by federal statutes. Writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Waddell,292 Justice Miller determined
that interference with establishment of a homestead on federal land fell within the
purview of federal statutes protecting the “right[s] or privilege[s] secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.”293 The Justices relied upon the same
federal statute in 1895 as valid authority for prosecuting individuals who interfered
with citizen reports of internal revenue law violations.294 The Justices explained the
need to allow Congress to protect the rights and privileges of national citizenship
through such laws in order to assure “the independence and the supremacy of the
national government.”295
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions reaffirmed the understanding that the Four-
teenth Amendment buttressed national supremacy. For example, in the Selective
Draft Law Cases,296 Chief Justice White explained for a unanimous court “how
completely [the Fourteenth Amendment] broadened the national scope of the Gov-
ernment under the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States to be
paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative.”297 Jersey City
violated the privileges or immunities of United States citizens when it attempted to
prohibit an assemblage of labor organizers.298 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,299 the Court’s plurality opinion noted that Jersey City had interfered
287 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
288 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
289 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
290 See supra notes 286–89.
291 As explained by Professor McGovney, “If counsel had put themselves the question,
what provision or text of Federal law creates or grants this alleged privilege or immunity the
vapidity of the contentions would have been immediately apparent.” McGovney, supra note
253, at 224–25.
292 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (upholding conspiracy provision derived from the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871).
293 Id. at 79.
294 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
295 Id. at 537.
296 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding national military draft).
297 Id. at 389.
298 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
299 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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with rights secured by the National Labor Relations Act when it attempted to pro-
hibit an assemblage of labor organizers, and by doing so the city had infringed upon
“privileges and immunities of the individual respondents as citizens of the United
States.”300 In 1948, the Court found that denial of property rights based upon
Japanese ancestry “deprive[d] Fred Oyama of the equal protection of California’s
laws and of his privileges as an American citizen.”301 The “privileges or immunities”
dimension of these decisions received relatively little attention, however, because
they could be explained as easily by reference to the Supremacy Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. The debate about incorporation of the Bill of Rights had shifted
to the Due Process Clause, which had become the focal point of questions about the
Supreme Court’s role in identification of fundamental rights.302
F. Commentary
For more than a century following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
commentators who addressed the issue agreed that “privileges or immunities of United
States citizens” included rights derived from federal statutes. Thomas Cooley, a
highly respected constitutional law treatise writer of his time, explained in 1880 that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected rights such as participation in foreign
and interstate commerce, benefits of postal laws, or navigation rights, “because over
all these subjects the jurisdiction of the United States extends, and they are covered
by its laws.”303 He questioned the necessity of the provision, given the Supremacy
Clause, but noted that the clause provided express authority for at least some prin-
ciples that had previously been merely implied,304 concluding that “[m]any abuses
of power are forbidden more than once in the federal Constitution, under different
forms of expression.”305
300 Id. at 514. In a separate opinion, Justices Stone, Reed, and Butler did not reject the rea-
soning that Congress created privileges or immunities of United States citizens when it enacted
the National Labor Relations Act, but they did not agree that the record of the case adequately
supported the conclusion that such rights were at issue. Id. at 522 (Stone, J., dissenting).
301 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (emphasis added). Although the quoted
text represents a reference to both the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Justices did not extend their analysis of those texts, and concurring
Justices indicated a preference for declaring California’s law invalid on its face based upon
the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 647 (Black, J., concurring).
302 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (triggering debate regarding Due Process
Clause incorporation of the Bill of Rights); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(recognizing a fundamental right of “freedom of contract,” analogous to the right that Justice
Miller had rejected in Slaughter-House).
303 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 245 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880).
304 Id. at 248 (citing, as an example, the right to visit the national capital).
305 Id.
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In his 1901 treatise, Judge Henry Brannon agreed with Cooley that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was not essential, that it emphasized “pre-existing law, imbedding
it in the Constitution forever, not leaving it to mere implication and court decision.”306
He explained the reasons for not trying to tie down the substantive scope of the clause
by noting that “[p]rivileges and immunities of the federal citizen may arise from new
legislation, so that legislation be within the scope of national authority. This shows
the futility, the danger of any infallible definition of ‘privileges or immunities.’”307
In 1918, Professor D.O. McGovney wrote an article summarizing privileges or
immunities doctrine in which he concurred with his predecessors that the text of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as authoritatively construed, reinforced federal su-
premacy.308 To capture the essence of the doctrine, he paraphrased the clause to
read: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privilege or
immunity conferred by this Constitution, the statutes or treaties of the United States
upon any person who is a citizen of the United States.”309 He subsequently explained
that, to understand the scope of the clause, counsel must ask “what provision or text
of Federal law creates or grants this alleged privilege or immunity.”310
III. TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
In the twentieth century, litigants collectively lost sight of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause. A primary reason for this lack of interest, as implied from the discussion
above, was the sense that the clause did not serve a useful purpose separate from the
role already played by the Supremacy Clause. Another factor had to do with a
parallel rejection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which lost
but eventually regained its status as a significant source of protection for individual
rights based upon state law. As described in the discussion that follows, in 1999 the
Supreme Court revived the Privileges or Immunities Clause311 even while simulta-
neously cutting back on individual rights to enforce federal statutes against state
agencies.312 More recently, the Supreme Court resolved to preserve the “settled
doctrine” that the Due Process Clause incorporated most provisions of the Bill of
Rights, eliminating any need to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause for that
purpose, but without discussing broader questions about what that settled doctrine
306 HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (1901).
307 Id. at 64.
308 See McGovney, supra note 253.
309 Id. at 220.
310 Id. at 225.
311 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
312 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (denying
monetary damages to plaintiffs who sued to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(rejecting patent claims against state actors).
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entails.313 When that discussion takes place, it should include both the recognition
of federal statutory rights, and an understanding of how those rights expanded as a
result of twentieth-century interpretations of the Commerce Clause.
A. Interpretations of Article IV, Section 2
During the time when the Privileges or Immunities Clause virtually disappeared
from the arsenal of litigants, a similar pattern of restrictive interpretations and
available alternatives led to avoidance of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of
Article IV, Section 2. Lack of development of that provision may explain why such
little attention has been given to arguments favoring a parallel approach to the
constitutional clauses protecting “privileges” and “immunities.” Just as Article IV
requires equal application of rights originating from state governments, the Four-
teenth Amendment requires equal enforcement of federal rights by all states. Neglect
of both clauses, however, limited consideration of that comparison.
As previously noted, the Article IV provision lost its role as a possible source
of judicially created substantive rights with the Supreme Court decision in Paul v.
Virginia.314 A more significant roadblock to development of the non-discrimination
principle identified in Paul, however, emerged in the early twentieth century, when
the Supreme Court stifled Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause litigation by
drawing a line between “residence” and “citizenship,” holding that protection ex-
tended only to the latter.315 States could freely discriminate against nonresidents as
long as they did not discriminate on the basis of “state citizenship.”316 As a result,
the Justices sustained a state statute mandating that insurance brokers reside within
the state, reasoning that the class discriminated against included citizens of the
enacting state who resided elsewhere.317 A subsequent line of cases reinforced the
distinction between nonresidents and noncitizens, which explains the minimal use
of Article IV in the decades that followed.318
313 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(accepting as “settled doctrine” decisions that incorporation of the Second Amendment should
be based upon the Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
314 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes
205–07. This is not to say that courts could apply the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 without making substantive judgments. As with all procedural issues,
there continues to be an underlying need to identify those cases to which equal treatment of
non-residents should apply. If confined to rights previously recognized within a state, how-
ever, that inquiry need not be seen as an open-ended search for substantive rights.
315 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 168.
316 Id. at 180. For discussion, see RICH, supra note 9, § 19:3.
317 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1919) (upholding a South Carolina
statute allowing only two-year residents to be licensed insurance brokers).
318 Litigants challenging state laws which discriminated against nonresidents generally had
more success with the Commerce Clause than with the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
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The Supreme Court Justices revived meaningful use of Article IV, Section 2 in
1975 when they eliminated the distinction between residency and citizenship.319
Those terms became interchangeable.320 That shift unleashed the power of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause.321
Even with restoration of the equality assurances of Article IV, however, claims
based upon the dormant Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause overshad-
owed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as a basis for protecting
the rights of nonresidents. Litigants lacked incentive to rely upon Article IV, encum-
bered by the need to prove that underlying interests fell within a nebulous definition
of protected interests, when references to the Commerce Clause served their pur-
poses. That changed, however, in the early 1980s with contrasting experiences in
challenges to the hiring practices of municipal contractors in Boston and Camden.322
In 1983, businesses seeking contracts with the City of Boston relied upon the dor-
mant Commerce Clause to challenge a local ordinance requiring that at least half of
a contractor’s workforce must be bona fide residents of the city.323 The Justices rejected
that challenge, explaining that protection of interstate commerce did not apply when
a state or local government acted as a market participant rather than as a market
regulator.324 One year later, however, the Justices considered a Camden, New Jersey,
ordinance requiring that at least forty percent of employees of city contractors be
Camden residents.325 In the Camden case, challengers relied upon the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV instead of the dormant Commerce Clause, and the
Court ruled in their favor.326 “[T]he pursuit of a common calling is one of the most
fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause.”327
The turnaround from Boston to Camden, and the reversal in constitutional assess-
ments brought about by that change, provide a template for reassessment of the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. Resurrection of a neglected
or forgotten clause of the Constitution made a difference, and litigation based upon
the Privileges and Immunities Clause became commonplace.328 The question now is
hence the former was used more often than the latter. That balance shifted with the Court’s
decision in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of City of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984). For discussion, see RICH, supra note 9, § 19:4.
319 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975).
320 See also United Bldg., 465 U.S. 208; Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
321 See Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487 (1981).
322 See United Bldg., 465 U.S. 208; White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460
U.S. 204 (1983).
323 White, 460 U.S. at 205–06.
324 Id. at 214.
325 United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 210.
326 Id. at 212, 223.
327 Id. at 219.
328 See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (rejecting tax
burdens that only applied to nonresidents); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274
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whether courts will repeat that pattern by recognizing the power of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause when due process or equal protection doctrine fails to provide
authority for Congress to act.
B. Revival of Privileges or Immunities
By the late 1990s, it may have appeared that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
had become “moribund,” therefore precluding reliance on traditional interpretations
of that text.329 The Supreme Court, however, rejected such views in the case of
Saenz v. Roe,330 referencing Justice Miller’s historical framework, and concluding
that the clause protects a “right to travel” by limiting discrimination against new
residents who had recently moved from other states.331
In the years leading up to that decision, the Justices had followed a meandering
path, searching for the right constitutional text on which to base the principle they
agreed to protect. In the leading case of Shapiro v. Thompson,332 a three-judge panel
in Connecticut had relied upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause in rejecting a one-
year residence requirement for welfare assistance,333 while a panel from the District
of Columbia had reached the same conclusion based upon equal protection princi-
ples.334 In his opinion for the Court, however, Justice Brennan did not even acknowl-
edge the privileges or immunities argument and relied instead upon the Equal
Protection Clause to strike down discrimination against new residents seeking welfare
assistance.335 Using that approach allowed him to cite the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause as a basis for rejecting the same limitations as imposed by Congress
(1985) (striking down state residency requirements for bar admission). But see McBurney
v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013) (concluding that public access to records under the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act did not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
329 In a 1998 bankruptcy case, a Third Circuit Court refused to identify such rights on
grounds that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had become “moribund.” Sacred Heart
Hosp. v. Pennsylvania, 133 F.3d 237, 244–45 (3d Cir. 1998). The United States Supreme
Court rejected that response just one year later in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking
down a one-year residency requirement for welfare applications as a violation of rights that
owe their existence to the “national character” of the United States).
330 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
331 Id. at 498–99, 502 n.15 (noting also that the “Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
modeled this Clause upon the ‘Privileges and Immunities’ Clause found in Article IV”).
332 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
333 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 (D. Conn. 1967). Note that in 1941, Justice
Jackson would have preferred reliance on the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the
Dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit states from blocking migration of “indigents.” Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181–82 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause “was adopted to make United States citizenship the dominant and
paramount allegiance among us”).
334 Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
335 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
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on new District of Columbia residents.336 Justice Stewart found a “right of entering
and abiding in any state in the union” independent of the Fourteenth Amendment.337 In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
but rejected that alternative because it would not have provided relief to parties from
the District of Columbia.338 Subsequent decisions struck down durational residence
requirements deemed unnecessary to establish bona fide residence with respect to
issues ranging from public assistance for medical care339 to job preferences,340 state
dividends from mineral income,341 and extended residence prior to voter regis-
tration,342 but did so without reference to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
In his opinion for the Court in Saenz v. Roe, Justice Stevens discussed the opin-
ions expressed in the Slaughter-House Cases.343 He noted the diverging views of the
Justices in that case, but emphasized the common ground, which in Saenz meant that
a citizen of the United States can move to any other state and in doing so assume the
same rights as other citizens of that state.344 In emphasizing that point, Stevens noted
the parallel between the definition of “privileges” and “immunities” described in the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV.345 He did not, however, have any reason to
address the additional “common ground” that could be derived from Justice Miller’s
opinion in Slaughter-House, assuring that rights which “owed their existence to the
federal government” would be fully protected in all states.346
336 See id. at 642 (relying upon the Equal Protection Clause to reject discrimination against
new state residents seeking welfare assistance).
337 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
338 Id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “is
limited in terms to instances of state action”).
339 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (striking down an Arizona
statute requiring one year of residence in a county in order to receive non-emergency hospital
care at county’s expense).
340 Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (barring New York from
limiting its preference to veterans who had previously resided in the state).
341 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (rejecting Alaska payments that increased com-
pensation based upon length of state residence).
342 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee law requiring indi-
viduals to reside in the state for fifteen months to be able to vote).
343 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503–04 (1999).
344 Id. at 502–04.
345 Id. at 501–03 (explaining different aspects of the “right to travel”).
346 Contrast the opinion of Justice Thomas, which provided an inaccurate depiction of
Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House, asserting that Justice Miller’s definition stated
“that ‘nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized govern-
ment is instituted,’ including ‘those rights which are fundamental,’ are not protected by the
Clause.” Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 46, 76 (1872)). In
the quoted passages, Justice Miller described the breadth of the phrase “privileges and immu-
nities” with respect to rights defined by state law and protected by Article IV as defined by
Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, but also emphasized the potential breadth of
“privileges or immunities” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and derived from sources
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Based upon the reasoning of Justice Stevens, it would be fair to suggest that
congressional use of the same words in the Fourteenth Amendment that already
appeared in Article IV created a presumption favoring harmonious treatment of the
two clauses. Article IV assures that residents from one state will be treated as “wel-
come visitors” by other states, and the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of
those who have moved from one state to another.347 Article IV also places all
citizens upon “the same footing with citizens of other states” with respect to privi-
leges and immunities derived from state law,348 and in parallel terms, the Fourteenth
Amendment assures that United States citizens receive the same protection of privileges
or immunities that “owe their existence” to federal law regardless of the state in
which they reside.349
C. Commerce Clause Expansion
When looking for reasons why the Slaughter-House dissenters disparaged Justice
Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, their list would be topped
by their belief that reinforcement of federal supremacy had minimal significance.350
Although rights derived from the Commerce Clause had been at the heart of prior
disputes targeting African-American seamen arriving in Charleston Harbor,351 that
particular battle ended with the elimination of slavery.352 In 1873, relatively few
individual rights could be routinely traced to federal statutes.353 The Justices could
not have anticipated the landscape that would emerge from twentieth-century inter-
pretations of the Commerce Clause.
Every student of constitutional history knows about the battle between Congress
and the Supreme Court over power to address issues affecting interstate commerce.
The rights of workers became a focal point of that conflict when the Court struck down
of federal law. Of course, with the expansion of federal Commerce Clause authority, current
breadth of federal rights far exceed specific rights that Justice Miller might have contemplated
in 1873.
347 Id. at 500.
348 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (concluding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not prohibit discrimination against corporations from other states).
349 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (limiting “privileges or immunities” to those
which “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws”).
350 See id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that “supremacy of the Constitution and the
laws of the United States always controlled any State legislation of that character” and “[i]f
this inhibition . . . only refers . . . to such privileges and immunities designated in the
Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain
and idle enactment”).
351 See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
352 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (majority opinion).
353 Id.
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a law restricting child labor.354 Subsequent decisions upholding the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act became emblematic of judicial recognition of expanded federal authority.355
Expansion of federal authority led to new questions about whether the Fair
Labor Standards Act could be applied to state workers. In 1968, a majority rejected
Maryland’s challenge to a requirement that states comply with minimum wage
legislation.356 Eight years later, a new majority on the Court reversed course, con-
cluding that application of minimum wage legislation to state employees interfered
with “integral governmental functions” in a manner that permitted the national
government to “devour the essentials of state sovereignty.”357 After another nine
years, however, the Court again changed course when Justice Blackmun decided
that such attempts to limit federal regulation of state workers were “unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice.”358 In a brief dissent, Justice Rehnquist warned
that it was not “incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine
points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support
of a majority of this Court.”359 In the years that followed, however, the Court did not
revive the approach that blocked application of federal law to state workers. Instead,
led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a majority seized upon the concept of sovereign
immunity as a mechanism for achieving a parallel constraint.360
Missing from the debate about the application of federal law to state workers
was any discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The rights in question,
however, fell squarely within the traditional descriptions of such rights as defined
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The distinction between
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment that Justice Miller made in Slaughter-
House reflected the division between state and federal authority as understood in
1873, with a clear implication that rights controlled by Congress would constitute
privileges or immunities. The relevant question for Justice Miller was whether the
privilege in question owed its existence to the federal government.361
Current federal statutes address a much broader range of interests than Justice
Miller might have contemplated. Characterization of Slaughter-House as the source
of a “narrow” category of rights362 fails to consider changes that have taken place in
354 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
355 See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S. 100.
356 See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
357 Usery, 426 U.S. at 855, overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
358 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
359 Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
360 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Bond Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (elaborating on Justice Rehnquist’s use of sovereign immunity as a restraint
on federal power).
361 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).
362 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 755 (2010) (citing the language used by
2017] HIDING IN PLAIN VIEW 1219
the role of the national government. While the list may have been narrow in 1873,
today that would be a ridiculous description. Furthermore, attempts to limit the
scope of federal statutory rights that constitute privileges or immunities should be
understood as indistinguishable from attempts to block congressional Commerce
Clause authority a century ago. When viewed as an attempt by courts to block fed-
eral regulation because of a lack of federal power,363 the analogy becomes clear. For
the same reason that Congress now has authority to enact the Fair Labor Standards
Act even though that power may not have been recognized in 1868, provisions of
that Act now constitute privileges or immunities of United States citizens.
D. State Immunity
By the terms described above, enforcement of federal rights should not vary
from one state to another; Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment assured that
Congress had authority to protect those rights.364 A citizen from Massachusetts
should be able to travel to South Carolina and secure full protection of the federal
law. Throughout the last century, commentators appeared to agree that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause had reinforced federal supremacy. They did so while question-
ing the need for reinforcement and lamenting such a limited role for a provision that
could have accomplished so much more.365 The need to reinforce federal rights re-
emerged, however, near the end of the twentieth century.
Two cases set the stage for rulings that limited enforcement of federal statutory
rights against state agencies. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,366 the Supreme
Court held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not be enforced directly
against a state, ruling for the first time that Congress could not rely upon powers
derived from Article I of the Constitution to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.367
In Seminole Tribe, the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment might override
Justice Miller to sharply distinguish between state and national citizenship, and emphasizing
the narrow scope of privileges and immunities as defined by Justice Miller).
363 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (concluding that federal attempts to
regulate child labor in the states through the Commerce Clause were invalid), overruled by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
364 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
365 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 1675 (2d Sess. 2004) (explaining that
Slaughter-House reduced privileges or immunities to “a superfluous reiteration of a prohi-
bition already operative against the states”); Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare
Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997)
(asserting that “[u]nder Slaughter-House, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has no indepen-
dent function, except as an alternative to using the Supremacy Clause”).
366 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
367 Id. at 72–73. In a strained reading of federal statutes, the Court also reasoned that
alternative remedial provisions in the federal law precluded injunctive relief based upon the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.
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the Eleventh Amendment state immunity never arose; that absence could be easily
understood in a context involving gambling rights of a Native American tribe. Al-
though disputes about sovereign immunity in such contexts had already become
familiar,368 the parties focused on core concepts of sovereignty and the ambiguous
nature of the Eleventh Amendment text.369
A second case, decided one year after Seminole Tribe, also helped to shape
subsequent decisions regarding the nature and scope of arguments about enforce-
ment of federal statutes against states. In City of Boerne v. Flores,370 the Supreme
Court struck down provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act371 in which
Congress had attempted to exercise its authority under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment to impose a “compelling interest” test on state or municipal laws
that impinged upon individual religious freedom, emphasizing primary judicial re-
sponsibility for determining the scope of the Bill of Rights.372 The majority con-
cluded that only those federal statutes “congruen[t] and proportional[ ]” to Supreme
Court interpretations of the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses fell within the
scope of Section Five enforcement authority.373 For obvious reasons, no one men-
tioned the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The direct onslaught on enforcement of federal statutes that could reasonably
fit within the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause began in 1999. In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,374 plain-
tiffs claimed that Florida had infringed on its patented method for administering its
college investment program.375 Florida asked the Court to block enforcement of the
Patent Remedy Act376 even though Congress had amended the Act explicitly to
368 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.) (noting that “language of the Eleventh Amendment gives us no hint that it limits
congressional authority”).
369 For an example of critical commentary regarding this issue, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte
Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 523–27 (1997).
370 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
371 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
372 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
373 Id. at 520. For a critique of the congruence and proportionality test in the context of issues
pertaining to sovereign immunity, see Y. Frank Ren, Note, Fixing Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power: An Argument for a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Congressional
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1459 (2014).
374 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
375 Id. at 631.
376 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994) (providing that “any State, any instrumentality of a State,
and any officer or employee of a state or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity, shall not be immune, under the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity”).
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authorize private actions against state agencies.377 To support the argument that Con-
gress could not rely upon Article I as a basis for abrogating state immunity, the Court
mechanically applied its holding in Seminole Tribe.378 The power of Congress to
protect patent rights predated and therefore fell victim to the Eleventh Amendment.
In Florida Prepaid, plaintiffs presented the Court with a second reason why
Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, arguing that a state violation of
patent rights constituted a violation of due process rights, and as a result Congress
had been empowered by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy such
violations.379 The Supreme Court majority rejected that argument, accepting the fact
that the Fourteenth Amendment would override the Eleventh, but concluding that
Congress lacked “evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become
a problem of national import.”380 Enforcement of the Patent Remedy Act against
states therefore failed the “congruen[t] and proportional[]” test of Boerne v. Flores.381
Subsequent cases reflected a similar pattern. In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,382 the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it authorized a private cause of action to enforce the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.383 The distinguishing question in that case was
whether congressional authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause extended to
protecting victims of age discrimination.384 The majority noted that age discrimina-
tion only triggers rational basis review of equal protection claims, and state age
classifications generally satisfied that standard.385 Although the federal law remained
otherwise valid as action authorized under congressional Commerce Clause author-
ity, it could not be enforced through a private cause of action for monetary damages
against a state agency because it failed the Boerne test.386 One year later, the Justices
applied the same rationale to rule that Patricia Garrett, who underwent a lumpec-
tomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy for treatment of her breast cancer,
could not seek monetary damages against the University of Alabama for its failure
to abide by the Americans with Disabilities Act.387
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Garrett explicitly noted Congress’s Article I
authority to enact the ADA and to prescribe standards to which states must acqui-
esce, explaining that ADA “standards can be enforced by the United States in actions
377 See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (2000).
378 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636–37.
379 Id. at 633.
380 Id. at 641.
381 Id. at 630, 637; City of Boerne v. Flores, 527 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
382 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
383 Id. at 92.
384 Id. at 66–67.
385 Id. at 84 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
386 Id. at 71, 73, 82.
387 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2001).
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for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young.”388 He also noted that “the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”389 Patricia Garrett
could not avail herself to those provisions, however, because equal protection doctrine
could not stretch to include the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA. Without
a recognized Fourteenth Amendment basis for its action, Congress could not abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment by allowing individuals to sue states for monetary dam-
ages, leaving Garrett with nothing more than a limited claim for injunctive relief.390
Because the Eleventh Amendment only applies to actions in federal courts,
litigants could theoretically have found a way around those constraints by bringing
their actions in state courts. The Supreme Court majority closed that door, however,
in Alden v. Maine,391 finding, “consistent with the views of the leading advocates of
the Constitution’s ratification, that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.”392 As a result,
the Fair Labor Standards Act could not be enforced by suits for monetary damages
commenced in state courts.
Numerous scholars responded to Alden by demonstrating inadequacies in the
Court’s analysis of original views, and the equally prevalent understanding by those
who ratified the Constitution that states did not retain sovereign immunity with respect
to subject matter transferred to federal control.393 None of the critics, however, con-
sidered the fundamental structural changes brought about by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, ignoring the long-standing principle that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
reaffirmed federal supremacy with respect to rights established by federal law.
Issues relating to state reliance upon the Eleventh Amendment in order to avoid
compliance with federal law arose most recently in a claim by Daniel Coleman that
the Court of Appeals of Maryland violated the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) by responding to his request for sick leave with notice that he would be
terminated if he did not resign.394 As in prior cases, the majority opinion relied upon
388 Id. at 374 n.9.
389 Id. at 364 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
390 Contra Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (upholding application of the
ADA against a state that failed to provide access to a courthouse, citing a fundamental right
of access to courts protected by the Due Process Clause).
391 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
392 Id. at 728.
393 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review,
Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1290–91, 1298,
1307 (2000) (questioning why, in light of the ambiguous silence regarding the Framers’ views
about state sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court majority should place higher value on pro-
tecting state treasuries than on providing a remedy for the victims of unlawful state action);
Strasser, supra note 63, at 605 (explaining how the Alden majority misconstrued history and
contradicted Framers’ intent).
394 Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332–33 (2012).
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the premise that states, as sovereigns, remained immune from suits for private
damages unless the basis for the claim arose from a constitutional amendment that
overrode the Eleventh Amendment.395 Claims based upon the FMLA complicated
this issue because of a prior Supreme Court opinion finding that family leave pro-
visions reflected congressional efforts to remedy discrimination against women, and
therefore met the “congruen[t] and proportional[ ]” test based upon prior Court
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.396 Petitioners limited their arguments
to that issue.397 The personal sick leave requirements that Coleman sought to enforce,
however, failed to pass the test.398
As with all of these cases, Coleman reflects a conception of state sovereignty
within a context where many have argued that states surrendered that sovereignty
from the outset.399 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed her view
“that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
Commerce Clause power,” without any need for an assist from the Fourteenth
Amendment.400 Although Justice Breyer shared that view, Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan notably joined the Ginsburg opinion but explicitly withheld endorsement of
the footnote reference to Commerce Clause authority.401 Their reluctance to assert
the primacy of national sovereignty based upon the Commerce Clause heightens the
current need to pursue an alternative approach to federal enforcement power based
upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Coleman also illustrates a logical fallacy contained within the Court’s current
approach. The FMLA can be enforced against state employers for claims based upon
its family-care provision, but not for personal sick leave, because current interpreta-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause extend heightened scrutiny to claims that
involve gender discrimination, but defer to the legislature for claims based upon
interests such as illness, age, or disability. Good reasons exist for not applying “strict
scrutiny” to age and disability classifications.402 Questions about the age or nature
of a disability that should trigger enforcement entail an unavoidable exercise of
political discretion. Furthermore, both age and disability cut across the social and
395 Id. at 1333.
396 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (concluding that the
FMLA was “congruent and proportional” to prior Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause as applied to cases of sex discrimination).
397 See Brief for Petitioner at 20–21, Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327
(2012) (No. 10-1016) (conceding that “Congress has this broad authority to abrogate the
states’ immunity only in the areas of suspect classification discrimination such as gender and
race” (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000))).
398 Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338.
399 See supra notes 62, 64.
400 Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
401 Id.
402 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (citing City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985)) (explaining difficulty of
line-drawing decisions regarding matters such as accommodations for disabilities).
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economic spectrum in ways that reinforce political protection. As a result, we expect
the legislative and executive branches of government to delineate these issues free
from the intense judicial constraints implied by strict scrutiny standards, but that
does not mean that federal efforts to address problems of age or disability discrimi-
nation are any less legitimate, or that victims of such discrimination are less deserv-
ing of protection. The fact that courts should defer to Congress when reviewing
questions about such discrimination seems incongruent with a conclusion that courts
should not defer to Congress within the context of enforcement.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD
The forgoing analysis establishes that the Privileges or Immunities Clause pro-
tects federal statutory rights of United States citizens. That interpretation reflects the
historical understanding, repeatedly expressed by Congress, the courts, and com-
mentators, and embedded within the “settled doctrine” of Slaughter-House.403 Because
few contemporary courts have considered that alternative, however, the task falls
upon future litigants to fill the void. In doing so they will need to explain that Four-
teenth Amendment references to the rights of “citizens of the United States” should
not be viewed as a constraint on the scope of protection. The perception that federal
rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause fit into a narrow or limited
category has no more relevance today than the belief that federal power to regulate
interstate commerce gives Congress a narrowly defined authority that does not ex-
tend to manufacturing or to issues involving civil rights.
Litigants must also address perceptions that Fourteenth Amendment boundaries
lie totally within judicial hands, and the United States Constitution does not allow
for the recognition of positive rights involving deference to legislative judgments.
For reasons described below, constraints of City of Boerne v. Flores have little ap-
plication to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.404 The operable test for privileges
or immunities has already been established by judicial precedent, and unless judges
now decide to overrule Slaughter-House and its progeny, they must enforce claims for
monetary damages based upon federal statutes against state agencies and officials.
A. Rights of Citizens
Unlike the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which protect all “per-
sons,”405 the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers to the rights of “citizens of the
403 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503–04 (1999) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 343–
46). In his opinion for the Court in McDonald, Justice Alito repeats the language from Justice
Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects those
rights “which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
404 See infra notes 447–55 and accompanying text.
405 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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United States.”406 That limitation, however, does not constrain the substance of those
rights as long as their source can be traced to the government of the United States.
In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller distinguished between rights “dependent
upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State.”407 Those seek-
ing to limit the scope of federal privileges or immunities may seize upon that lan-
guage as if it confined such protection to rights that only citizens could enjoy, or
rights that only the national government could confer. Such restrictions, however,
would defy both text and precedent. The line that Miller drew referred to relative
sources of legal authority.408 More than half of the examples provided by Justice
Miller involved matters such as the right to peaceably assemble or to petition for
redress of grievances that also apply to noncitizens, and states may unquestionably
protect the same rights.409 Miller also explicitly included rights derived from the
broad powers of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.410
In his seminal article on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Professor McGovney cited all of the factors described above as evidence that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause extends beyond a narrow category of rights attached
exclusively to citizenship.411 He concluded with the explanation that protected rights
of an individual include those conferred “by national law, whether it is conferred
upon him because he is a citizen, or because he is a human being . . . it is none the
less a privilege ‘of citizens of the United States’ that others have the same privi-
lege.”412 Almost a century later, in a comprehensive review of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Professor David Bogen made the same point, explaining that
“Citizens of the United States have privileges or immunities because the Constitu-
tion or federal government provides them rights, even though the rights may be
available to noncitizens as well[,]” and concluding that “any right that the federal
government secures for its citizens by statute or treaty may be a privilege or immu-
nity of citizenship.”413 All of the scholars who, over the years, have described the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a reaffirmation of federal supremacy,414 and all
of the scholars whose research demonstrates an original understanding that the Clause
406 Id.
407 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872).
408 See id.
409 See id. at 79.
410 See id. at 49. As described in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), the navigation right referred to by Justice Miller was based upon a federal license
authorized by Congress.
411 See McGovney, supra note 253, at 238–42. In 1938, the Association of American Law
Schools recognized McGovney’s article for its “permanent value.” 1 ASS’N OF AM. LAW
SCH., SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at v (1938).
412 McGovney, supra note 253, at 240–41.
413 DAVID SKILLEN BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 123 (2003).
414 See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
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incorporated the Bill of Rights,415 should concur. Neither of those perspectives would
be compatible with a narrow interpretation that limits the scope of privileges or im-
munities to a list defined by national citizenship.
B. Judicial Deference and Positive Rights
A key difference between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment involves the
level of deference that judges extend to the legislative and executive branches of
government. Tests for congruence and proportionality with judicial interpretations
only apply to the latter provisions. As discussed below, the Justices have already
implicitly recognized the need for this shift,416 bringing Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment more closely in line with expectations of those
who crafted the Amendment.
Explicit delegation of congressional authority to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments to the Constitution reflected both an assumption that Congress would be in
charge and a distrust of the judicial branch that existed at that time.417 Congressman
Bingham’s defense of the Ku Klux Klan Act began by noting the competence of
Congress to “provide by law for the better enforcement of the Constitution and laws
of the United States,”418 and then emphasized “the power of Congress to provide by
law for the enforcement of the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government
of the United States both against individuals and States.”419 As Professor Rebecca
Zietlow has noted, “the Reconstruction Era Congress was primarily preoccupied
with its own role, and not the role of the Court, in defining and enforcing constitu-
tional values.”420
When the Supreme Court Justices addressed the need for judicial control over nega-
tive rights in City of Boerne v. Flores, they noted separation of powers reasons for
giving judges primary responsibility for interpreting the “self-executing prohibitions
415 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 171.
416 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001)
(noting in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court that changes in the positive law
should be generated by the legislature rather than the judiciary).
417 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13 TEMP.
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 485, 492 (2004) (noting that “any influential members of the 39th Con-
gress emphatically rejected the argument that the court was the only branch that could create
constitutional meaning”).
418 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1871).
419 Id.
420 See Zietlow, supra note 417, at 492. Zietlow also points out that constitutional scholars
have contributed to the judicial centric view of the Constitution. Id. at 490 (noting that
“constitutional scholars have played an important role in enabling the Court to view itself as
the only legitimate interpreter of the Fourteenth Amendment because they have focused
almost exclusively on the Court, and not Congress, as a constitutional actor”).
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on governmental action.”421 This rationale for elevated Supreme Court responsibility
disappears, however, in the context of privileges or immunities, when the set of
separation of powers concerns turn in the opposite direction from those discussed
by the Justices in Boerne.
Members of the Supreme Court majority who insisted upon standards of con-
gruence and proportionality to limit congressional authority acknowledged this dis-
tinction between negative and positive rights. In rejecting a broad approach to
congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that laws to protect interests of elderly or disabled citizens should be
generated by the legislature: “If special accommodations for the disabled are to be
required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection
Clause.”422 Significantly, the Justices did not question congressional Commerce Clause
authority to enact such laws; Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed their validity even in
the context of enforcement against the states through either suits for injunctive relief
or direct federal government action.423 Patricia Garrett lost her claim, however, be-
cause she sought monetary damages, and the Chief Justice failed to recognize any
authority by which federal positive law could supersede the Eleventh Amendment.424
Recognition of congressional authority over the definition and implementation
of positive rights admittedly conflicts with the conception of “rights . . . in the strong
sense,”425 but that perceived weakness may also be its strength.426 An approach to
privileges or immunities based upon deference to Congress avoids many if not all
of the objections traditionally raised against constitutional recognition of positive
rights.427 For example, the problem of indeterminacy428 has been solved by respect-
ing the role that the popularly elected branches of government will play in promul-
gating and enforcing such rights. The difficult lines will be drawn by the parties best
equipped to manage that role. Judges may be poorly suited for exercising the dif-
ficult strategic line-drawing needed to determine whether the minimum wage should
421 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523–24 (1997).
422 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
423 Id. at 374 n.9.
424 Id. at 360, 363.
425 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977) (explaining that
“Constitutional rights that we call fundamental . . . are supposed to represent rights against
the Government in the strong sense”).
426 But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2329 (1990) (arguing for positive rights defended by the judiciary, and not left entirely to
legislative or executive action).
427 See generally Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001).
428 Id. at 901–09; see also Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution
of State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 818–19 (2002) (noting benefits of deferring to
a state legislative definition of positive rights which “affords the state flexibility in defining and
elaborating the scope and content of the basic right to meet new and changing circum-
stances”). Note that Hershkoff argues for a level of entrenchment in state constitutions. Id.
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be limited to certain enterprises, or when the minimum should be adjusted for in-
flation.429 Such decisions should be made by the legislative and executive branches,
but allocating that authority should not undermine the enforceability of such rights
once they have been established.
Deference to congressional recognition of positive rights also helps to address
concerns about politicizing the judiciary. Few would question the characterization
of federal judges as political actors, at least when defined as individuals who have
discretionary authority that will have political consequences, and with perspectives
regarding such issues that likely differ depending upon the political interests of
those who make judicial appointments.430 Because the parameters of rights housed
within the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be defined by Congress, however,
politicization of judicial decision-makers would be constrained. Although judges
could still attempt to limit the scope of prescribed statutory rights, their emphasis
should shift to protecting remedial authority, understanding that such decisions re-
main subject to legislative correction.431
Still another advantage of giving legislators rather than judges the primary re-
sponsibility for defining the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has to do with the very nature of democratic governance. Arguments have been made
that legislators act less responsibly when they know that final decisions will be made
by the judges.432 Those fears could take on even greater weight if judges had primary
responsibility for defining positive rights, when one could imagine legislators re-
fusing to meet needs of vulnerable groups because they knew that societal interests
will be protected by someone else. The positive rights embodied by federal law and
included under the Fourteenth Amendment umbrella avoid this problem.
One more reason for not giving courts primary authority to recognize positive
constitutional rights stems from recognizing that enforcement requires resources,
and the most likely recipients of positive rights often lack the resources to bring such
actions.433 Lodging rights within the Privileges or Immunities Clause and recognizing
congressional responsibility for defining the scope of those rights, however, reinforces
the enforcement resources of the federal government. Designation of federal statu-
tory rights as “privileges or immunities” will add individual enforcement powers
within the context of claims against states without diluting other resources.434
429 See Cross, supra note 427, at 924 (concluding that “[i]f judges did involve themselves
actively in an effort to secure such rights, they would probably make matters worse”).
430 For discussion about the political nature of entrenched constitutional issues, see
generally MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2010).
431 For additional discussion of “non-court-bound rights,” see generally William E.
Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different From All Other Rights Talk?: Demoting the Court
and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771 (1994).
432 See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
433 See Cross, supra note 427, at 880–81.
434 Note in particular the importance of continuing to recognize private actions against
state governments based upon the Supremacy Clause which have come under assault in
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None of these arguments suggest that courts must give a blank check to Con-
gress when asked to determine whether federal action falls within a legitimate realm
and constrains state governments. The Supreme Court requires that if Congress
intends to abrogate state immunity, it must pass the simple but “stringent” test of
“making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”435 The
greater obligation of the courts, however, would be to reinforce congressional judg-
ments, both by deferring to congressional decision-making and by doing so in a
manner that reflects the broad remedial spirit that characterized the original design
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights laws that it spawned.436
Some may object to a characterization of privileges or immunities based upon
federal statutes as “constitutional rights,” asserting that the combination of ambigu-
ity and congressional control conflict with our conceptions of “entrenched” rights.
Of course, there is no inherent need to equate “privileges or immunities” with tra-
ditional conceptions of “rights,” but the similarity may run more deeply than first
appearances suggest. The ambiguous nature of these words does not distinguish
them from other rights associated with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause share similar characteristics. And although
constitutional “entrenchment” as traditionally defined implies judicial control, within
this context the task of prohibiting state and local government abridgment arguably
satisfies the definition of a “constitutionally recognized, judicially enforceable
restraint on popular government.”437 The judicial enforcement role in this context
parallels the role already played within the context of Article IV, where judicial
deference to legislative judgments has been a given.438 What results is a partnership
between Congress and the courts in protecting our privileges and immunities. As
recent years. Elimination of such actions would mark another substantial departure from the
constitutional structure represented by the Fourteenth Amendment, and in particular by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
435 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241–42 (1985).
436 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (noting the need to broadly construe 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which protects federal privileges or immunities). Although beyond the scope
of this Article, it should be noted that, for reasons described by the United States Supreme
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (concluding that
local government units should be “included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies”),
the Court should also see this as an opportunity to overrule the decision made in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (applying reasoning that was subsequently rejected in Monell
to conclude that state agencies were not “persons” as that term was used in what is now 42
U.S.C. § 1983). See also Zietlow, supra note 417, at 487 n.15 (noting the “particular def-
erence” that the Supreme Court should exercise when reviewing statutes that create “rights
of belonging”).
437 See Cross, supra note 427, at 860 (defining “positive rights”).
438 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320) (noting
deference to “such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of
the whole”).
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Edward Rubin has noted, “[w]hen the courts act in partnership with the legislature,
they can be seen as supporting democracy, rather than undermining it.”439
Privileges or immunities of today look different than the nineteenth-century
versions, and die hard originalists may use that difference to object to the conclu-
sions that privileges or immunities encompass statutory rights.440 Their observations
may be accurate, but ultimately insignificant. The national government plays a
different role in the lives of Americans living in the twenty-first century than it did
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the very fact of these changes illus-
trates the practical utility of the terms “privileges” and “immunities.”441 Like all
modern democracies, we live in a welfare state with an enormous federal bureau-
cracy, and we gain little by attempting to confine constitutional interpretation to a
mind frame that existed in a different century.442
C. The Test for Privileges or Immunities
In order to restore uniform enforcement of federal law, litigants should now turn
to the enforcement power derived from the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doing so, however, requires an answer
to the question of whether matters such as an employee’s right to a minimum wage
or unpaid sick leave falls within the scope of government conferred “privileges” or
“immunities.” In the absence of precedent, this could be a difficult line-drawing prob-
lem. Fortunately, however, precedent abounds.
In Maine v. Thiboutot,443 the Justices concluded that state deprivation of welfare
benefits protected by the Social Security Act violated Section 1983.444 The majority
found “no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide
a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights.”445 After the Justices decided in Thiboutot that Congress meant to
439 See Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, The Constitutional Meaning of Statutes,
and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639,
1710 (2012). Note that the fundamental basis of “entrenchment” lies within American
culture, and few would contest the cultural commitment to Social Security or a minimum
wage when compared to either the right to bear arms or the choice to have an abortion.
440 But see Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief:
Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257 (1999); William P.
Quigley, The Earliest Years of Federal Social Welfare Legislation: Federal Poor Relief
Prior to the Civil War, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 157 (2002).
441 See BRANNON, supra note 306, at 64 (noting the danger and futility of precise definitions
of privileges or immunities given the role of new legislation); Rubin, supra note 439, at 1663
(noting that “[a]n evolutionary approach to the [C]onstitution captures the dynamic way that the
interpretation of particular constitutional provisions responds to changing situations”).
442 As Chief Justice Marshall admonished, “we must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
443 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
444 Id. at 5.
445 Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (concluding
that municipalities are persons under § 1983)); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446
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provide a broad remedy for violations of federal rights when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, they explained that to invoke that law, plaintiffs must convince
the courts that they have a “right secured” by federal law.446 The Justices refined and
clarified that requirement in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,447
upholding rights conferred by the National Labor Relations Act and identifying a
three-part test to determine the scope of liability under Section 1983. Rights, privi-
leges, or immunities have been established by federal statutes if: (1) the law estab-
lishes binding obligations;448 (2) the interest is not too “vague and amorphous” for
judicial enforcement;449 and (3) the person claiming the right was an intended bene-
ficiary of the federal law.450
Identification of federal privileges or immunities may also be drawn from
analogies to case law enforcing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
In doing so, it should again be emphasized that the distinction between privileges and
immunities of Article IV and those recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment involve
distinctions in the source of state or federal authority, and not in the nature of the
rights themselves.451 One of the most frequently cited privileges and immunities
(1991) (finding that rights implied by the dormant Commerce Clause gave rise to “rights,
privileges, or immunities” protected by § 1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1989) (enforcing the National Labor Relations Act).
446 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (finding lack
of congressional intent to establish a personal cause of action to enforce provisions of a
federal financial aid program for treatment of the developmentally disabled).
447 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
448 Id. at 112 (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976)).
449 See id. at 106 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 431 (1987)).
450 See id. (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 431–32 (1987)); see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (concluding that a federal child support enforcement program had not
created a federal right). This analysis does not address the separate question of whether a
federal statutory scheme establishes a private cause of action within a context of dual state
and federal agency responsibility. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1378, 1387–88 (2015) (rejecting implied cause of action based upon the Supremacy Clause
to enjoin state Medicaid reimbursement rates); Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (remanding for consideration of federal Medicaid law preemp-
tion when federal agency had accepted state statutes at issue). Although that issue lies
beyond the scope of this discussion, renewed understanding that private interests in federal
law may constitute privileges or immunities of United States citizens provides a basis for
reconsideration of those issues, and in particular for assured protection of “parties actually
affected by a State’s violation of its statutory obligations.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1393
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
451 Note also that the judicial role in recognizing “privileges” or “immunities” recognized
under Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment also differs in that some subject matters
acted upon by states allow for legitimate distinctions between state residents and persons
from out of state, thus necessitating line-drawing between such claims. That issue does not
arise within the federal context. Fourteenth Amendment text explicitly allows for protection
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cases involved an 1871 Maryland statute which the Supreme Court struck down
because it assessed a license fee against nonresidents to trade in goods not manufac-
tured within the state.452 In 1880, Justice Harlan noted for the Court that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV secures “the equality of commercial
privileges . . . to citizens of the several States” and forbids any State to materially
abridge and impair such privileges.453 Justice Steven’s opinion for the Saenz Court
identified those “privileges and immunities” to which newly arrived state citizens
are entitled,454 emphasizing that cases construing the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 already protect rights of interstate travelers to obtain
employment, procure medical services, and “even to engage in commercial shrimp
fishing” on an equal footing with state residents.455 Based upon this precedent, it
would be difficult to argue that a state could restrict the benefits of sick leave re-
quirements or minimum wage laws to its own citizens. If such discrimination would
violate Article IV, then sick leave or minimum wage laws belong within the cate-
gory of “privileges and immunities.”456
The remaining question should be whether such rights fall within a category that
owes its existence to the federal government. If so, then a consistent approach to the
same words should mean that Daniel Coleman and John Alden had rights to enforce-
ment of the FMLA or the Fair Labor Standards Act against the states of Maryland
and Maine. Patricia Garrett should have been able to sue the University of Alabama
for violations of her rights under the ADA. In other words, federal statutes that
protect the rights of state employees fall within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Privileges or Immunities Clause.
D. Future Litigation
As implied by the preceding discussion, not every statute that involves federal
rights will provide a path to establishing state liability. A primary roadblock results
from the Supreme Court ruling that when Congress imposed liability on “persons”
who violate Section 1983, that term did not encompass states, state agencies, or even
state officials acting in their official capacity.457 As a result, prospective plaintiffs
that is limited to citizens of the United States, and given that authority, deference to Congress
should become the guiding principle in recognizing federal privileges or immunities.
452 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
453 Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1879).
454 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).
455 Id. (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)).
456 Judges seeking to constrain federal remedies for state violations of federal statutory
rights may claim that such interests do not fall within the category of privileges or immuni-
ties reserved for United States citizens. As previously explained, however, such arguments
cannot be squared with historical interpretations by Congress, courts, or commentators. See
supra text accompanying notes 414–15.
457 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (ruling that state officers could not be sued
in their official capacity for monetary damages). Arguments based upon a more accurate
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must find an alternative basis for establishing federal claims against states. Instances
in which Congress explicitly established a statutory basis for claims against states
provide appropriate starting points for future litigation.
For a number of reasons, federal statutory rights of state employees belong near
the top of a list of claims that should now be brought to enforce the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The Fair Labor Standards Act, the ADA, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the FMLA all specifically provide for state liability.458
Furthermore, from Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell459 to recent
holdings of the United States Supreme Court,460 equal employment rights have been
consistently included within the scope of “privileges” or “immunities.” Although the
Supreme Court denied claims against states for monetary damages with respect to
each of these laws, none included references to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
As a result, granting relief would not involve overruling precedent. To the contrary,
in each case deeply rooted precedent mandates that privileges or immunities embod-
ied by these laws fit squarely within the enforcement powers of Congress.
Although this discussion has focused upon the rights of state employees, the
principles of uniform protection of federal law extend to other contexts. Thus, liti-
gants should be encouraged to target states that violate intellectual property rights.
Florida Prepaid461 provided a textbook example of our collective amnesia regarding
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. If plaintiffs had considered the full depths of the
legislative record, they could have brought to the Court’s attention statutes overhaul-
ing intellectual property by many of the same members of Congress who drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment.462 The authors of those statutes generally reserved patent
rights to United States citizens, providing that “an alien shall have the privilege
herein granted if he shall have resided in the United States one year . . . and made
oath of his intention to become a citizen.”463 Courts in that era commonly and
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause provide a basis for challenging that
ruling, but asserting such claims should not fall within the first order of business for those
seeking to expand protection of federal rights.
458 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012) (FLSA provision defining “employer” to include public
agencies); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2012) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act provision
defining “employers” to include states or political subdivisions of states); 29 U.S.C. § 2911
(4)(B) (2012), invalidated by Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (FMLA provision in-
cluding public agencies as “persons engaged in commerce”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) (2012)
(ADA provision incorporating definition of “person” that includes government agencies).
459 For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 106–20.
460 See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of City of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 223 (1984) (limiting preference for city residents in municipal contracts); Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533–34 (1978) (striking down employment preference for “qualified”
Alaska residents).
461 For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 374–80.
462 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
463 Id. § 40 (emphasis added). The same Act also reserved trademark rights to those
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repeatedly referred to the “privilege” that federal patents provided to United States
citizens.464 Furthermore, federal law precludes states from independently recogniz-
ing or enforcing patent rights; federal courts provide an exclusive forum for resolv-
ing such disputes.465 Few rights established by federal law could more clearly satisfy
the standards set forth by Justice Miller in Slaughter-House, and every member of
the Court that decided that case would presumably have agreed.466 Nevertheless,
litigants in Florida Prepaid relied entirely upon attempts to stretch the concept of
due process in order to find a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action that would
override the Eleventh Amendment. None of the briefs filed with the Court men-
tioned the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Contemporary rights building upon the platform of Corfield and Slaughter-
House could also include the right to live in a healthy environment, free from toxins
and protected from degradation.467 To the extent that Congress has recognized an
individual cause of action against state actions that threaten the environment,468 the
Privileges or Immunities Clause becomes a source of authority to enforce such rights.
As in other contexts, as a result of recognizing this Fourteenth Amendment source
of authority, actions brought against state agencies or officials should not be limited
by claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Rights associated with the Bankruptcy Clause belong in a unique category with
respect to issues of state immunity. In 2006, the Supreme Court Justices concluded
that claims against state agencies holding property claimed by a bankruptcy estate
were not subject to Eleventh Amendment constraints.469 Justices Stevens’ opinion for
the Court emphasized the constitutional commitment to uniformity in bankruptcy,
and the in rem nature of such proceedings.470 Based upon that history, he arrived at
an “ineluctable conclusion . . . that States agreed in the plan of the Convention not
domiciled in the United States or in a “foreign country which by treaty or convention affords
similar privileges to citizens of the United States.” Id. § 77 (emphasis added).
464 See, e.g., Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U.S. 288, 299 (1876) (denying relief in a patent infringe-
ment action); Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 607 (1876) (referring to the “ordinary form of
such actions for infringement of the privileges secured by a patent”).
465 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
466 See supra text accompanying notes 256–76. Note that Intellectual Property rights are
also commonly protected by international treaties, another category explicitly included in the
Slaughter-House framework. Enforcement of rights derived from international trade agree-
ments such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (TRIPS), should therefore also be enforceable
against state actors.
467 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320)
(protecting the rights to “enjoyment of life and liberty . . . and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety”).
468 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (allowing “any person” to “commence a civil ac-
tion on his own behalf”).
469 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 375 (2006).
470 See id. at 360–77.
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to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought
pursuant to ‘Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.’”471 The claim that bankruptcy
claims fall within a narrowly defined “plan of the convention” because of the
reference to uniformity within that narrow context provides just one version of the
“plan” originally referred to by Alexander Hamilton, and details remain obscure.472
The Court’s decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz473 left an open
door for state avoidance of bankruptcy jurisdiction in some cases, especially when the
in rem label of the bankruptcy proceedings might not apply.474 A rationale based
upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, would close that gap.
The claims described above are based upon congressional power derived from
either the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, or the Bankruptcy
Clause. Historic text can be readily tied to those sources of congressional authority,
with the national government having exclusive control within the context of intellec-
tual property and bankruptcy, and with extensive precedent establishing the scope of
federal power within the context of interstate commerce. Furthermore, in all of those
contexts Congress has explicitly provided for enforcement against state governments.
Another significant body of rights that should fall within the scope of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause came about as a result of congressional exercise of its
Spending Clause authority to “provide for the General Welfare.”475 Topics ranging
from welfare assistance to health care and education fall within this category.476
Although state sovereign interests remain generally intact with respect to internal
governance of matters relating to the general welfare, federal supremacy arises with
471 Id. at 377–78 (distinguishing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
472 Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion for the Court in Katz, had previously argued
that states surrendered their claims to immunity with respect to all powers granted to
Congress in Article I of the Constitution. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
144 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court decision in Katz could also be used to restore the original “plan of the
convention,” but to this date lower courts have rejected such claims. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n
of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1314–15
(11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting application of Katz to intellectual property enforcement); Ramirez
v. State ex. rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t, 326 P.3d 474, 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014)
(rejecting application of Katz to case involving congressional action under the War Powers
Act cited in relationship to employment rights of a National Guard member), rev’d, 372 P.3d
497 (N.M. 2016).
473 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
474 See, e.g., Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 549 B.R. 103, 155
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding that claims were distinguishable from in rem proceedings,
and state immunity remained); Ginn-La St. Lucie Ltd. v. Ginn, No. 08-29769-BKC-PGH,
2010 WL 8756757 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
475 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
476 See Rubin, supra note 439, at 1643 (explaining how statutes such as the Affordable
Care Act change “the way we think about American Citizenship . . . , [and suggest] that the
U.S. Constitution guarantees so-called positive rights, such as rights to sustenance, decent
housing, an adequate education, and, of course, basic health care”).
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the advent of congressional expenditures, including the pattern of federal and state
partnership programs that characterize much of this field. In 1974, the Supreme
Court expanded the reach of sovereign immunity by holding that states were not
liable for retroactive monetary damages resulting from their failure to comply with
federal law in administering financial aid and health care to aged, blind, and dis-
abled persons.477 Although the sovereignty issues become more complex within that
context, especially given the dual nature of state and federal management responsi-
bilities,478 the text of the Eleventh Amendment should never have been stretched to
apply to such actions.479 Review of the Privileges or Immunities Clause will provide
an opportunity for correction, including a renewed emphasis upon the judicial role
in assuring that intended beneficiaries of federal law receive promised protection.
A more complete identification of federal statutory rights that should no longer
be subject to state claims of immunity remains beyond the scope of this Article.
Additional review of this topic would provide an appropriate forum for recognizing
Franklin Roosevelt’s “Second Bill of Rights” proposed as a response to the Great
Depression and embedded within federal laws that followed.480 Additions to the list
may also come from an examination of positive rights that already appear in many
state constitutions;481 parallels could be drawn between the evolution of positive
rights within states and the development of counterparts in federal law. As a first
step, however, judges should be asked to recognize that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause provides a path for developing these alternatives.
477 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
478 Opening the door to monetary damages does not eliminate more complicated questions
regarding availability of a private cause of action that arises within the context of dual state
and federal management of various welfare programs. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). For discussion, see supra note 450.
479 See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS 98–101 (2014) (arguing for amending the
Constitution to correct the overreach of sovereign immunity in cases like Edelman v. Jordan).
Justice Stevens proposed a constitutional amendment to correct such problems, providing
that “[n]either the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, nor any other provision of
this Constitution, shall be construed to provide any state, state agency, or state officer with
an immunity from liability for violating any act of Congress, or any provision of this Con-
stitution.” Id. at 106. Proper interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however,
should obviate much of the need for such an amendment.
480 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 105–08 (2004) (describing the traditional view of
America’s Constitution as a charter of negative rather than positive liberties but rejecting this
view of “American exceptionalism” as a basis for denial of positive constitutional rights);
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 211 (2001).
481 See, e.g., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 67–105 (2013) (focusing on
positive rights to education, workers’ rights, and environmental protection); Hershkoff, supra
note 428; Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive
Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989).
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CONCLUSION
Lack of constitutional recognition for the statutory rights established by Congress
became a serious problem in the late twentieth century when a majority of Supreme
Court Justices ruled that millions of United States citizens could not fully enforce
their rights against state employers or agencies. As a result, the degree of protection
afforded by federal law varies from one state to another. The Court’s rulings reflected
an incoherent conception of state and federal sovereignty that conflicts with the origi-
nal understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Justices only addressed
the scope of congressional power under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Constitution, however, a door remains open to seek enforcement of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause. When asked the proper question, future courts should
conclude that individual rights established by federal law belong within the category
of privileges or immunities of United States Citizens. No states should be allowed
to “make or enforce any law which shall abridge” those rights.482
482 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
